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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Essays on Firm Strategy and Market Outcomes
by
Brady Vaughan
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
Washington University in St. Louis, 2015
Professor Marcus Berliant, Chair
In the first chapter of my dissertation, Aleksandr Yankelevich and I examine the effects
of price matching guarantees on duopoly markets. We find that a commitment to price-
match raises prices by altering consumer search behavior in three ways. First, price-matching
diminishes firms' incentives to lower prices to attract consumers who have no search costs.
Second, for consumers with positive search costs, price-matching lowers the marginal ben-
efit of search, inducing them to accept higher prices. Finally, price-matching can lead to
asymmetric equilibria where one firm runs fewer sales and both firms tend to offer smaller
discounts than in a symmetric equilibrium. These price increases grow with the proportion
of consumers who invoke price-matching guarantees and also in the level of equilibrium
asymmetry.
The second chapter studies the effect of the complexity of consumers' preferences over a
product on that product's market structure. I relate complexity of preferences to the num-
ber of dimensions of a Lancasterian characteristic space. Using a novel higher dimensional
Hotelling model, I find that a fixed number of firms are likely to be better off competing
over products with more complex preferences. Although firms face more intense compe-
tition in higher dimensional markets, the greater product differentiation afforded to them
allows them to charge higher prices and earn higher profits. This result provides a clear
vii
theoretical foundation for the observation that goods associated with more complex pref-
erences typically display a greater variety of products sold. Additionally, I show that the
behavior of more than two firms competing in more than one dimension differs wildly from
that of firms typically studied in models of spatial competition.
The final chapter will examine firms' motives for implementing grandfather clauses that
allow certain consumers to continue to access a service at a favorable, but no longer avail-
able price. Grandfather clauses permit firms to price discriminate between early adopters
and new consumers in exchange for forfeiting the right to optimally set prices for early
adopters. They may be used to thwart competition following a structural change, to re-
spond to cost shocks, or to retain customers who consume another good from a multi-
product firm. We analyze under what conditions firms might choose to offer grandfather




In my dissertation I seek to extend our knowledge of the ways that firms compete with one
another in the marketplace. Particularly, I explore a variety of practices other than sim-
ply altering the price or quality of their product that firms use to gain an edge over their
competition. In much of the economics literature it is supposed that firms can only gain
long term advantage by selling either a superior product or a product they can produce at
reduced cost. However, in equilibrium we observe that firms use a huge variety of special
promotions, limited time offers, and other sorts of manipulation to gain advantage. Due to
their persistence in equilibrium, it must be supposed that many of these marketing prac-
tices do confer advantages. My work seeks to understand the channels through which these
advantages may be gained and whether or not the practices should be considered poten-
tially harmful.
Each chapter of my dissertation focuses on a different strategy employed by firms. The
second studies price matching guarantees, the third studies multi-axis product differen-
tiation, and the last studies the use of grandfather clauses. The work is theoretical, and
as such is mostly concerned with developing conceptual frameworks in which these phe-
nomenon can be studied. Accordingly almost all of the techniques employed can be found
1
in calculus or real analysis. More information on these works' relation to the literature,
scope, and results can be found in the introductory section of each of the chapters.
The second chapter of my dissertation is coauthored with Aleksandr Yankelevich. While
he contributed the majority of the work concerning the construction of the model and the
proof of the main results, I contributed a thorough simulation of the environment over a
restricted parameter space which is used extensively to explain the environment to the
reader as well as forming the meat of section 2.6. Additionally, I helped motivate the model
by referencing the concept of "deal-prone" consumers. Finally, I did significant work in the





Price-matching guarantees can be found in a variety of markets, including consumer elec-
tronics, office supplies, clothing, groceries and hotels. These guarantees typically come in
the form of an offer by a firm to lower its price to that of a cheaper rival selling an iden-
tical good for consumers who can offer proof of the rival's price. Firms inform consumers
about their price-matching guarantees in television advertisements, using print ads, and
over the Internet. For instance, in one commercial, Walmart tells viewers that it will match
rival prices eighteen times within the span of thirty seconds to remind consumers that its
every day low prices are Backed by [its] Ad Match Guarantee.1 In a holiday ad, Toys R
Us asks viewers why they would shop anywhere else for toys when the highest concentra-
tion of the hottest toys is at Toys R Us, all with price-match guarantee.2 Because of
such marketing efforts, consumers who engage in repeated interactions with price-matching
1See Walmart Match It Commercial. youtube.com. May 07, 2011. Retrieved February 28, 2015.
〈http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CIXOU7DQdS8〉.
2See Toys R UsHoliday 2012 Commercial`Toy Tracker Price Match'. youtube.com. November 04,
2012. Retrieved February 28, 2015.
〈http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=fvwp&v=3mQ0xmzeSfI&NR=1〉.
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brands, come to expect these guarantees. The expectation of a price-matching guarantee
should influence the way a consumer shops, which in turn affects firm pricing. It is already
well known that when consumers have additional information about firms, their shopping
behavior can change.3 Yet, in spite of the wealth of economics and marketing literature
studying price-matching guarantees, the exploration of their effect on consumers' shopping
incentives remains limited.
Economists initially viewed price-matching guarantees as being anti-competitive. This idea
was first raised by Hay (1982) and then Salop (1986), who suggest that these guarantees
allow firms to immediately retaliate against rival price cuts without actually listing lower
prices or expending resources to learn about competitor prices. This can lead to tacit col-
lusion in a non-cooperative equilibrium by removing firms' incentives to cut prices. Sub-
sequently, this view was formalized in multiple settings: Bertrand oligopoly (Doyle 1988),
differentiated products Stackelberg duopoly (Belton 1987), Hotelling duopoly (Zhang 1995),
and differentiated products Bertrand duopoly where consumers incur hassle costs of apply-
ing price-matching guarantees (Hviid and Shaffer 1999).4 Such models leave no room for
consumers to make shopping decisions. Tacit collusion occurs because firms respond to
each other, not to their customers.
An alternate line of reasoning posits that price-matching guarantees allow firms to price
discriminate between consumers with limited price information and those who are informed
about multiple price quotes. For example, Png and Hirshleifer (1987) show that price-
matching guarantees allow firms to keep list prices high to extract welfare from uninformed
consumers, while attracting informed consumers by offering to price-match the rival firm
when it offers a lower price. Models with heterogeneous consumers have also been used to
3See for instance, Robert and Stahl (1993) and Janssen and Non (2008).
4More recently, Hviid and Shaffer (2010) have shown that price-matching guarantees can complement
the price-increasing effect of a most-favored-customer clause when both are offered unilaterally by a single
firm.
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suggest that price-matching guarantees can lead to pro-competitive effects. For instance,
Corts (1996) and Chen, Narasimhan, and Zhang (2001) show that when firms use price-
matching guarantees to price discriminate, some or all consumers may end up paying lower
prices and consumer welfare can increase. Using surveys of potential consumers, Jain and
Srivastava (2000) and Srivastava and Lurie (2001) argue that consumers perceive stores
that offer price-matching guarantees to have lower prices. Moorthy and Winter (2006)
and Moorthy and Zhang (2006) build on this argument by constructing models of price-
matching with respectively, horizontal and vertical firm differentiation, where consumers
consider their location or service preferences when choosing where to purchase and con-
sumers who are uninformed about prices use price-matching as a signal that influences
their price expectation for a particular firm. They show that when the difference in pro-
duction costs between the two firms is sufficiently large and the uninformed population
is sufficiently small, price-matching guarantees can be used to signal a low price and con-
sumer welfare improves for a range of parameters.
While each of the aforementioned models has shown that price-matching can alter firm
pricing behavior, as Moorthy and Winter point out, and as we explore in detail in this ar-
ticle, another allocative effect of price-matching is its impact on consumers' incentive to
invest in information about prices (i.e., to price shop). Price-matching models of tacit col-
lusion preclude this effect by assuming that all consumers are perfectly informed about
firm pricing decisions. Consequently, in these models, either price-matching leads to a
symmetric monopolistic outcome, or in order to avoid the monopoly result, the authors
assume that products are somehow differentiated. However, firms generally will not honor
price-match guarantees on products that are not identical.5 Price-matching models based
5An alternative interpretation casts product differentiation in terms of differences in firm location. But
this interpretation is at odds with the idea of perfect price information unless all consumers can travel
freely from store to store. Although this is conceivable in an on-line retail environment, price-matching
guarantees often stipulate that on-line prices will not be matched.
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on price discrimination assume that consumers are heterogeneous with respect to the amount
of price information that they possess. However, differences in price information are exoge-
nously imposed and consumers may be assumed to act in a way that is in contrast to what
they would do were they allowed to engage in optimal shopping behavior.
We depart from the earlier literature by endogenizing the incentive to acquire price infor-
mation and allowing consumers to engage in optimal price search using a duopoly version
of Stahl's 1989 model of sequential consumer search in which firms first have an option
to offer a price-matching guarantee before setting prices for a homogeneous good. There
are two types of consumers in the market: those who face no opportunity cost of search-
ing (referred to as shoppers) and those who do (non-shoppers). In Stahl-type models, it
is well established that consumers follow a reservation price rulecontinue searching only
if the last price observed is greater than an endogenously determined reservation price
while firms randomize over lower prices to attract shoppers and over higher prices to real-
ize greater profits from non-shoppers.
In this framework, we find that price-matching guarantees bring about a number of price-
increasing changes in consumer search behavior. First, because shoppers freely observe
every price, in Stahl's original model, the firm with the lowest listed price captures all of
them. However, when consumers know that firms price-match, some shoppers can use a
price-matching guarantee to obtain the lowest price at a firm listing a higher price. This
option diminishes firms' incentive to lower prices because the lowest listed price no longer
guarantees a firm will capture all shoppers. Recognizing this price-increasing effect, non-
shoppers anticipate higher prices in firms they have not sampled. Hence, a second price-
increasing effect arises from non-shoppers' willingness to pay a higher maximal price at
the firm where they begin their search rather than pay the search cost to sample another
firm's price.
As in Stahl's model, in equilibrium only shoppers sample the prices of both firms. Conse-
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quently, consumers who use price-matching guarantees (the shoppers) never expect them
to yield a lower price. This stands in particular contrast to the Chen, Narasimhan, and
Zhang (2001) model of consumer heterogeneity and competitive price-matching guaran-
tees, where price-matching alters prices via information gains on the part of previously
uninformed consumers, who may use the guarantees to secure lower prices. The fact that
optimal searchers cannot realize such gains in our model seems to us rather sensible: price-
matching can be a time consuming activity which only price conscious consumers with a
lower opportunity cost of using their time should be expected to engage in. Moreover, be-
cause search is endogenous in our model, price-matching guarantees not only have the po-
tential to diminish firm incentives to lower prices, but also to inhibit search activity in a
way that raises prices even further.
In a recent article, Janssen and Parakhonyak (2013) also found that price-matching guar-
antees raise prices through their effects on consumer search. However, there are a num-
ber of important differences between this article and Janssen and Parakhonyak (2013), the
foremost of which is that whereas we analyze a setting where price-matching policies are
advertised by firms and invoked by consumers prior to purchase, Janssen and Parakho-
nyak explore the impact of posterior price-matching in which some consumers can get a
discounted price if after having purchased from a firm that turns out to offer a price-match
guarantee, these consumers acquire additional price information (e.g., from friends) that a
different firm offers a lower price.
Unlike in our model (or that of Chen, Narasimhan, and Zhang 2001), Janssen and Parakho-
nyak cannot analyze how firms such as Walmart or Best Buy, with a reputation for price-
matching, influence consumer behavior. Because in the model of Janssen and Parakho-
nyak, consumers do not learn whether or not a firm offers to price-match until they have
sampled its price, price-matching guarantees do not affect search order. Moreover, Janssen
and Parakhonyak suppose that price sensitive shoppers, whom we believe are natural can-
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didates to invoke price-matching guarantees, never use these guarantees. Instead, as in
Chen, Narasimhan, and Zhang (2001), price-changes in Janssen and Parakhonyak (2013)
occur when uninformed consumers react to information gains that crop up because of
price-matching guaranteesthough unlike in Chen, Narasimhan, and Zhang (2001), con-
sumers are punished with this additional information.
We find that the more informed consumers (shoppers) invoke price-matching guarantees,
the more powerful the price-increasing effects of price-matching. In particular, we study
what happens when a proportion of shoppers chooses not to invoke guarantees, possibly
as a result of hassle costs of doing so. As this proportion decreases in number, average
prices increase, and if both firms offer price-matching guarantees, prices can reach the
monopoly level in the limit where all shoppers invoke the guarantees. This result lends
theoretical support to the empirical finding by Dugar and Sorensen (2006), that the mar-
ket price varies inversely with the number of positive hassle cost buyers. Thus, as Dugar
and Sorensen point out, firms that advertise price-match guarantees, but at the same time
make them difficult to invoke, may be using them primarily to price discriminate among
consumers rather than to achieve tacit collusion. Conversely, a regulator observing a trend
in ease of use of price-matching guarantees might be concerned that they are being used to
facilitate collusion.6
Finally, an additional finding in this article is that price-matching guarantees may lead to
a multitude of asymmetric equilibria where otherwise homogeneous firms have different
pricing strategies. In such equilibria, one firm sells to more shoppers, whereas the other
plays a pricing strategy that leads it to sell to more non-shoppers. As the disparity in the
proportion of each consumer segment that firms serve grows, firm profits increase at the
6Recently, certain brick and mortar businesses have begun matching on-line competitors. For instance,
Toys R Us states that it will match Walmart.com, Amazon.com, and other selected online competitors.
Moreover, the increasing use of smartphone technology makes it easier to offer proof of a rival's lower
price.
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expense of consumers. The higher the proportion of non-shoppers a firm serves, the more
profit it will lose from these captive consumers by lowering its price to attract shoppers,
and the less inclined it is to do so. The upward shift in this firm's price distribution im-
plies that the firm that focuses on catering to shoppers does not need to lower prices as
much to expect to capture the same proportion of them and its price distribution shifts
upward as well. Hence, the more asymmetry that price-matching entails, the greater the
welfare loss to consumers.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2.2 sets up the model and
equilibrium concept. Section 2.3 characterizes consumer search behavior. Section 2.4 solves
for equilibrium when price-matching is imposed exogenously. Section 2.5 characterizes the
complete market equilibrium when shoppers do not direct their search (that is, shoppers'
search path is random). Section 2.6 numerically examines the consequences of asymmetric
equilibria that prevail when shopper search is directed (and asymmetric). Section 2.7
concludes. All formal proofs are contained in a Supplemental Appendix.
2.2 Model and Equilibrium
With the exception of the framework for the acquisition of price information, our model-
ing assumptions are standard in the price-matching literature. Two firms, labeled 1 and
2, sell a homogeneous good. Firms face no capacity constraints and have an identical con-
stant cost of 0 of producing one unit of the good. There is a unit mass of almost identical
consumers with inelastic (unit) demand and valuation v > 0 for the good.
Consumers are a priori uninformed about prices, but they can learn about them through
search. Following Stahl (1989), we assume that a proportion µ ∈ (0, 1) of the consumers
have 0 search cost. These consumers are viewed as having no opportunity cost of time
and are henceforth referred to as shoppers. The remaining 1 − µ consumers, called non-
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shoppers, pay search cost c ∈ (0, v) for each firm they visit with the exception of the
first.7 Search is sequential with costless revisits. After observing the price at the first firm
for free, consumers decide whether or not to search the next one or to exit the market al-
together. Consumers who have visited both firms may freely choose the cheapest price ob-
served.8
In a model without price-matching, shoppers freely sample both prices and always buy
from the firm with the lower listed price, but in a model where firms publicly announce
offers to price-match, after sampling both prices, shoppers might choose to invoke a price-
matching guarantee to purchase the product from a firm with the higher listed price. A
shopper might, for instance, wish above all to procure the product at the lowest price,
but given the opportunity, to do so at a particular firm (perhaps because of store brand
preference or favorable store characteristics that are unrelated to the product being pur-
chased). Such a shopper could then first sample the competing price and if necessary,
invoke a price-match guarantee at the preferred firm rather than going back to the com-
petitor. Alternatively, certain shoppers who have ended their shopping trip at the higher-
priced firm may be deal-prone (e.g., Lichtenstein, Netemeyer, and Burton 1990; DelVecchio
2005), valuing not only the ability to secure the lowest price, but also the opportunity to
purchase a good at a discount off the listed price. These shoppers strictly prefer the price-
match deal to a return trip to the lower priced firm.9
7The assumption that the first visit is free is standard in the literature and we interpret it to mean
that the non-shopper initially believes that he must have the good and treats the cost of the first visit as
sunk. Janssen, Moraga-Gonzàlez, and Wildenbeest (2005) analyze a sequential search model with costly
initial visits.
8One way to interpret the search cost is as a cost of finding out the price in a particular firm for the
first time rather than as the cost of traveling there. Janssen and Parakhonyak (2014) show that when sec-
ond visits are costly in a Stahl oligopoly search model, firms nevertheless use pricing strategies that are
identical to the perfect recall case.
9A third explanation for invoking price-matching guarantees follows if instead of interpreting shoppers
as having no opportunity cost of time, we treat them as individuals who read sales ads (Varian 1980) or as
users of price-comparison sites (Janssen and Non 2008). In this case, if we think of some shoppers as grav-
itating toward their local firm unless its competitor offers the lower price, then such shoppers could use a
price-matching guarantee to avoid traveling to the non-local firm. We thank a reader for this suggestion.
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However, in reality, not all shoppers would choose to price-match given the opportunity.
Regardless of how different consumers value their time, some simply do not pay attention
to price-matching announcements,10 whereas others may find the act of keeping and track-
ing price ads or the additional other activity needed to procure a price-match in some way
distastefulor as the literature often terms it, a hassle. Moreover, even if all shoppers ob-
serve price-matching announcements and find the application of a price-matching guaran-
tee to be a hassle free activity, some shoppers may be unable to invoke a guarantee due
to the discretion of a store worker who is unwilling to provide the match even though her
employer has announced a price-matching policy.11
In order to account for the possibility that some shoppers would prefer to invoke a price-
matching guarantee at the last store visited while others would prefer to purchase at a
store that lists the lower price, we assume that when the two firms offer different prices,
θS ∈ [0, 1] of shoppers face some impediment to using price-matching guarantees (e.g.,
they are unaware that the guarantees are available or find price-matching a hassle) and al-
ways purchase from the firm with the lower listed price instead.12 The remaining 1 − θS
shoppers will invoke a price-matching guarantee at the last firm they stopped in when one
is available and necessary to obtain the lower price there and purchase from the firm with
the lower listed price otherwise.13
10It is not uncommon in the advertising literature to assume that some portion of consumers will re-
main unaware of certain attributes of a product or firm even when they are familiar with the product's
price. For instance, Meurer and Stahl (1994) assume that buyers are aware of the prices of all existing
products, but may not know which product offers the best match. Firms may advertise to inform con-
sumers whether the product is a good match, but some consumers remain uninformed in equilibrium.
11For instance, Bloomberg has reported that workers at certain chains known for their price-matching
policies, nevertheless may not execute the policies consistently. See Dudley, R., Rupp, L. Price Matching
Criticized From Wal-Mart to Toys `R' Us: Retail. Bloomberg. April 30, 2013. Retrieved February 28,
2014. 〈http://bloom.bg/ZhGPis〉.
12We may, as done in Hviid and Shaffer (1999), treat this impediment as a hassle cost z ≥ 0 of invoking
a price-matching guarantee. However, because no shopper would ever pay zit does not appear in any
equationit suffices to treat θS as a type of tie-breaking rule.
13In principle, when one firm charges a lower price and its competitor offers a price-matching guar-
antee, 1 − θS represents the proportion of shoppers who are indifferent between these two firms (the re-
maining θS strictly preferring the firm charging a lower price due to impediments to price-matching). Our
11
When θS = 1 (no shoppers invoke price-matching guarantees), it is easy to show that the
equilibrium outcome reduces to that in Stahl (1989), such that we will generally limit our
analysis to θS < 1. Although we analyze equilibrium when θS = 0 (see Proposition 4),
there is reason to believe that empirically, θS is higher.
14 Therefore, throughout our analy-
sis, we often focus on equilibria where θS ∈ (0, 1).
In order to capture the idea that a firm may develop a reputation for price-matching, we
suppose that the game proceeds in three stages, as follows:
1. In stage one, firms simultaneously decide whether to adopt a price-matching guaran-
tee. A firm that has adopted such a guarantee pre-commits itself to sell the good at
the minimum listed price to consumers who have observed both prices and are hence
able to invoke the guarantee. A firm that has not committed to price-match at this
stage does not offer customers a price-matching guarantee in the price search stage.15
2. In the second stage, each firm's price-matching decision is known to all agents in the
model. Firms then simultaneously choose prices, taking into consideration their be-
liefs about rival firm strategies as well as consumer search behavior. A pricing strat-
tie-breaking rule presumes that such shoppers purchase from the last firm they visit as long as they can
obtain the lower price there. One may rationalize this assumption by supposing that θS subsumes not only
those shoppers who face an impediment to invoking a price-matching guarantee, but also indifferent shop-
pers who always purchase from the firm listing the lower price. Alternatively, we could assume that 1− θS
shoppers obtain some additional deal value from invoking a price-matching guarantee. Doing so would
require certain modifications to our profit equations that would nevertheless preserve all of our findings.
14To our knowledge, Moorthy and Winter (2006) provide the only published data measuring the fre-
quency with which price-matching guarantees are invoked in a retail setting. They find that redemption
rates rarely surpass 10 percent in their retailer survey and average 5.8 percent, with a median of 5 per-
cent. In contrast, recent empirical studies which seek to estimate search costs find that the percentage of
consumers who search more than one firm is significantly higher than 10 percent. For instance, Moraga-
Gonzàlez and Wildenbeest (2008) estimate that between 70 and 78 percent of consumers in the market
for personal computer memory chips search more than once. De los Santos (2012) finds that 24 percent of
searches leading to a transaction in the on-line book market visit more than one bookstore. This suggests
that not all shoppers would invoke price-match guarantees when they could.
15In practice, some firms may offer price-matching guarantees without advertising an intent to price-
match, in which case some consumers may unexpectedly happen upon the guarantees during the search
process. Such firms are outside the scope of this article. Janssen and Parakhonyak (2013) study firms that
make their price-matching decisions simultaneously with their pricing decisions, exclusively focusing on
price-matching firms that don't announce their intent to price-match.
12
egy consists of a price distribution Fi, where Fi (p) represents the probability that
firm i offers a price no higher than p. The lower bound and upper bound of the sup-
port of the distribution for firm i are denoted as p
i
and p¯i, respectively.
3. After prices have been realized, consumers choose optimal search strategies given
their beliefs about each Fi.
Throughout, parameters v, c, µ, and θS, as well as the rationality of all agents in the model
are commonly known.
The equilibrium concept used is Sequential Equilibrium. Intuitively, we can think of con-
sumers who observe an off-equilibrium price at the first firm they sample as treating such
deviations as mistakes when forming beliefs about the remaining firm's strategy. That is,
consumers believe that unsampled firms play their equilibrium strategies at all information
sets.
2.3 Consumer Search Behavior
Shoppers freely search both firms before making their purchase decision. For non-shoppers,
it is well known that in models such as the one we have set up, the optimal search rule is
to sample firms in ascending order of magnitude of the reservation price associated with
searching each firm, with equal reservation prices implying indifference (this is known
as Weitzman's 1979 Pandora's Rule). Moreover, the optimal stopping rule is for a non-
shopper who has freely observed the price at firm j to continue search if and only if the
observed price is higher than a reservation price, ri, which makes him indifferent between
searching firm i and stopping. This reservation price is then defined as the solution to16∫ ri
p
i




Fi(p)dp = c (2.1)
16The first equality follows from integration by parts as long as there is no mass at p
i
, which according
to Proposition 1 below, is always the case.
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Note that reservation price ri corresponds to non-shoppers who begin their search at firm
j and vice versa because non-shoppers who begin at firm j must decide whether or not
to search firm i based on the price they observed at firm j and their beliefs about firm i's
pricing strategy.
Suppose that r1 = r2 in equilibriumthat is, non-shoppers are indifferent regarding the
search order. If both firms choose the same action in the first stageboth match, or nei-
ther doesin the absence of additional a priori information about the firms, it is natural
to suppose that the initial search would be random and that half of each type of consumer
would visit each firm first. However, if one firm matches while the other does not and all
consumers randomize their first search, as will be seen in Section 2.4, firms will set prices
such that non-shoppers would prefer to search the non-matching firm first, a contradiction.
Therefore, indifference requires some consumers to place greater probability on sampling
the non-matching firm in equilibrium. Moreover, even if both firms choose the same first
stage action, equilibria where heterogeneous consumers who are indifferent sample the two
firms with different probabilities may exist (such as where one firm ends up selling to more
shoppers and the other to more non-shoppers). To account for such asymmetries, we sup-
pose that in equilibrium, shoppers and non-shoppers search firm 1 with respective proba-
bilities βS and βN , where βS, βN : B → [0, 1] and where B = [0, v] × (0, 1) × [0, 1] is the
Cartesian product of the intervals that contain parameters c, µ, and θS. For concision, go-
ing forward, we omit the arguments on βS and βN . We note that in an equilibrium where
r1 6= r2, so that non-shoppers strictly prefer to begin search at a particular firm, βN equals
0 or 1.
Because shoppers will obtain the lowest price regardless of where they begin their search,
to add structure to our model, in a number of propositions below we focus on equilibria
where shoppers' search path is random (βS = 1/2). Moreover, from Propositions 1 to 6,
we focus on equilibria where r1 = r2 (non-shoppers are indifferent between which firm to
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sample first, though the search path is not necessarily random), whereas in Proposition 7
we characterize equilibria where r1 6= r2. In Section 2.6 we examine equilibria where βS 6=
1/2.
2.4 Firm Pricing Strategies
Working backwards, in this section, we derive equilibria in the four possible subgames that
follow firms' price-matching decisions: the subgame where neither firm price-matches,
the subgame where both firms price-match, and the two subgames where only one firm
matches. In Section 2.5, we compare the outcomes that prevail in each of the pricing sub-
games to determine firms' optimal price-matching policies.
Proposition 1 below states that in general, firms do not play pure pricing strategies in
equilibrium.17 It also places limitations on the way that firms may price in equilibrium,
and consequently on the way that consumers search. It tells us that regardless of firms'
price-matching decisions, firms will generally not offer a price higher than the largest pos-
sible price of their competitors, nor a price high enough to induce non-shoppers to search
more than one firm. The proof, which borrows heavily from standard mass shifting argu-
ments found in Narasimhan (1988), Stahl (1989) and Janssen and Non (2008), is highly
involved. Therefore, in the Supplemental Appendix, we provide a sketch of the intuition
that references these articles in addition to a complete proof.18
Proposition 1. Suppose that all consumers are indifferent regarding which firm to sample
first and that in the event that both firms offer price-matching guarantees, θS 6= 0. Then
in equilibrium, firms play mixed pricing strategies over the same supports. The supports do
not contain any breaks, they are bounded from above by p¯ = min {v, r} where r = r1 = r2,
17The lone exception occurs when both firms offer price-matching guarantees on the equilibrium path
and θS = 0. This is explored in Proposition 4.
18As is discussed in footnote 24, the qualification that consumers are indifferent regarding which firm to
sample is not technically necessary, but is useful for the purpose of exposition.
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and at most one firm may have one mass point at p¯. If a mass point exists in equilibrium,
then non-shoppers who sample firm i first, must stop searching after observing a price of rj
unless v < rj.
As will be seen below, the equilibrium outcome is symmetric if and only if all consumers
choose their first price sample at random (βS = βN = 1/2). In this case, because ac-
cording to Proposition 1, at most one firm may have a mass point in equilibrium, when
the equilibrium outcome is symmetric, there are no mass points and both firms always run
salesthat is, they price below p¯ with probability 1. Alternatively, the equilibrium may
be asymmetric, in which case one firm has a mass point at p¯. Note that because accord-
ing to Proposition 1 a price equal to r and strictly higher than v is only observed off the
equilibrium path, in equilibrium, non-shoppers whose first observation equals r (and who
are hence indifferent between stopping and searching the next firm) stop. Therefore, be-
cause firms never price above r, as in Stahl (1989), non-shoppers only sample one price in
equilibrium. This means that in equilibrium, price-matching can only impact non-shoppers
indirectly because a consumer cannot use a price-matching guarantee without observing a
second price.19
In the following two subsections, we analyze equilibria in subgames where both firms make
the same price-matching decision. We conclude that in a subgame where both firms offer
price-matching guarantees, consumers expect higher prices and firms expect higher profits
than in a subgame without price-matching.
19In this respect, we differ from Janssen and Parakhonyak (2013), who assume that an exogenous pro-
portion of non-shoppers discovers the rival firm's price post-purchase without further search. These non-
shoppers are then assumed to invoke a price-matching guarantee at the first store if the rival's price is
lower.
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2.4.1 Neither Firm Price-Matches
Following Stahl (1989), Astorne-Figari and Yankelevich (2014) show that in the subgame
without matching, there is a unique Sequential Equilibrium where both firms distribute
prices over support [(1− µ) p¯/(1 + µ), p¯] with distribution F (p) = (1 + µ) (1− p/p) / (2µ),
where p¯ = min {v, r∗} and r∗, the equilibrium reservation price, is defined as
r∗ =







if r (µ, c) ≤ v
∞ otherwise
(2.2)
In equilibrium, regardless of shoppers' search order, shoppers will always purchase from
the firm with the lower listed price. On the other hand, non-shoppers randomly choose to
sample one firm and because p¯ = min {v, r∗}, they purchase from the first firm sampled
without observing the price of the other firm.20 Thus, as in Stahl (1989) firms randomize
over lower prices to attract shoppers, and over higher prices to extract greater profits from
captive non-shoppers.
2.4.2 Both Firms Price-Match
When both firms offer price-matching guarantees, the expected profit that each firm ob-
tains from shoppers differs markedly from that when price-matching is not available. Con-
sider the expected profit equation for firm 1 when both firms offer to price-match:
E[pi1 (p1, F2 (p1))] = (1− µ) βNp1
+µ {p1 (βSθS + 1− βS) [1− F2 (p1)] + (1− θS) (1− βS) E [p2|p2 < p1]F2 (p1)}
(2.3)
20Hence, the equilibrium outcome is the same for all βS ∈ [0, 1] (βS is absent in Equation (2.2) and
F (p) above), whereas βN = 1/2 in equilibrium. Suppose this were not the case. From Astorne-Figari and
Yankelevich (2014), we know that when βN 6= 1/2 (λ in their article), the price distribution of the firm
that more non-shoppers choose to sample first, first order stochastically dominates that of its rival. This
would imply that the reservation price associated with the rival firm is lower, such that all non-shoppers
would prefer to sample the firm with the dominated distribution first, a contradiction.
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Suppose that firm 1 sets price p1. From Proposition 1, we know that the (1 − µ)βN non-
shoppers who sample firm 1 first stay there and pay p1. When neither firm offers to price-
match, with probability 1 − F2(p1), p1 < p2 and firm 1 sells to every shopper in the mar-
ket. Otherwise it does not sell to shoppers. However, when both firms offer price-matching
guarantees, as can be observed by decomposing the second line of Equation (2.3), the or-
der in which firms are sampled matters and firm 1 cannot expect to capture every shopper
by listing a lower price.
When p1 < p2, firm 1 captures µ(1 − βS) shoppers who previously sampled firm 2 and
discovered a lower price in firm 1 as well as µβSθS shoppers who first sample the price of
firm 1 and upon learning the price of firm 2, purchase from firm 1 rather than invoke a
price-matching guarantee at firm 2. Each of these shoppers pay p1 to firm 1. The remain-
ing shoppers invoke a price-matching guarantee at firm 2. However, although firm 1 may
lose some shoppers that it would have captured with a lower price sans price-matching
guarantees, by offering to price-match, it hedges its losses when it ends up with a higher
price than firm 2 because some shoppers will invoke a price-match guarantee at firm 1. In
particular, with probability F2(p1), we know that p1 ≥ p2. In this case, shoppers who sam-
ple p1 first all purchase from firm 2, but the µ(1−θS)(1−βS) shoppers who visit firm 2 first
will invoke a price-matching guarantee upon sampling firm 1 and paying firm 2's expected
price to firm 1 (that is, E [p2|p2 < p1]).
In Proposition 2 we characterize the Sequential Equilibria for the subgame where both
firms offer price-matching guarantees and θS ∈ (0, 1]. The proposition indicates that
price-matching can influence prices in three ways: (i) directly by altering firms' price dis-
tribution functions, (ii) indirectly via the reservation price, and (iii) through its effect on
the sampling order of individual consumers, as represented by βS and βN . Proposition 2
characterizes equilibria where βS ≥ 1/2. Equilibria where βS < 1/2 follow analogously.
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Proposition 2. Suppose that firms are exogenously required to offer price-matching guar-
antees, all consumers are indifferent regarding which firm to sample first, and θS ∈ (0, 1].









µ (βSθS + 1− βS) + (1− µ) βN
] θS
βSθS+1−βS
, min {v, r∗}
]




r (µ, θS, c, βS, βN) if r (µ, θS, c, βS, βN) ≤ v∞ otherwise ,
r (µ, θS, c, βS, βN) = c
{
1− [(1− µ) βN ]
θS
βSθS+1−βS
µ (1− βS) (1− θS)
×
{
[µ (βSθS + 1− βS) + (1− µ) βN ]
(1−βS)(1−θS)








(1− µ) (1− βN)
























In equilibrium, the expected prices for the two firms equal each other.
Following Stahl (1989), the proof of this proposition proceeds by using firms' indifference
between all actions in the supports of their distribution functions to solve for distribu-
tions F1 and F2 and then by applying the distributions to non-shoppers' optimal stop-
ping rule (Equation (2.1)) to solve for the reservation price. The difference in this article
is that when firms offer to price-match, the changes in consumer shopping behavior fol-
lowing Equation (2.3) substantively alter firms' indifference conditions via their expected
profit equations. This changes firms' price distributions as well as non-shoppers' reserva-
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tion price.




















The first equation follows from Weitzman's (1979) Pandora's Rule and non-shoppers' indif-
ference (so r2 = r1 = r); the second, which sets the expected price of the two firms equal
to each other, follows from integration by parts together with the fact that p¯ =min {v, r}
in equilibrium. Using the expected price equality, E1 [p] = E2 [p], we can now implicitly
solve for βN as a function of the remaining parameters.
If βS = 1/2, it is readily seen that the unique value of βN ∈ [0, 1] that solves E1 [p] =














It also follows that, F1 (p) = F2 (p), and consequently, that neither firm has a mass point
at p¯. This establishes existence. Although the symmetric equilibrium is perhaps the most
natural one when both firms price-matchconsumers choose the first price sample at ran-
dom in the absence of any information differentiating the two firmsthe equilibrium is
not unique, and in Section 2.6, we numerically explore the existence of equilibria where
βS > 1/2 (and as a consequence, βN > 1/2).
Our next two resultsPropositions 3 and 4make more precise the effect that price-matching
has on firms' price distribution functions and non-shoppers' reservation price.
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Proposition 3. Suppose that firms are exogenously required to offer price-matching guar-
antees and βS = βN = 1/2.
1. Then in equilibrium, a firm price distribution with a lower proportion of shoppers µ
or lower proportion of shoppers who ignore price-matching guarantees θS dominates
one with a higher proportion in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance.
2. If r∗ < v, then r∗ is decreasing in µ and in θS.
Because p¯ = min {v, r∗}, as was the case when firms did not offer price-matching guaran-
tees, in any equilibrium described in Proposition 2, non-shoppers choose a firm to search
first and make a purchase there, whereas all shoppers search both firms and obtain the
lower price. However, contrary to the subgame without matching, the lower price is not al-
ways obtained at the firm with the lower listed price. For instance, as noted above, if firm
1 has the lower listed price, the µ(1 − βS) shoppers who search firm 2 first all purchase
from firm 1, but of the µβS shoppers who search firm 1 first, µβSθS purchase from firm 1
while µβS(1 − θS) obtain a price-match at firm 2. This inability to capture all shoppers at
the lower listed price diminishes firms' incentive to set lower pricesand more so the lower
θS.
The first-order stochastic dominance relationship in Part (1) of Proposition 3 together
with Equation (2.1) imply that the lower θS, the higher the equilibrium reservation price.
When βS = βN = 1/2, a simple application of l'Hôpital's rule will show that Equa-
tion (2.2) is the limit of the equilibrium reservation price in Proposition 2 as θS approaches
one (as the proportion of shoppers who invoke a price-matching guarantee goes to zero).
According to Proposition 3, Part (2), for any θS < 1, the latter reservation price is never
lower than the former. This means that a price that could induce a non-shopper to search
in an equilibrium without price-matching might no longer do so in an equilibrium with
matchingthat is, non-shoppers may be willing to accept higher prices in lieu of search in
21
a symmetric equilibrium with price-matching. Thus, when consumers engage in optimal
search, the price increasing effect of price-matching guarantees is exacerbatedsearch is
inhibited over a wider range of prices for a subset of the population.
Together, Propositions 2 and 3 tell us that price-matching guarantees do not offer a price
benefit to consumers because a portion of consumers never uses them, while the remain-
der could procure the lower listed price with or without them.21 This stands in contrast
to existing studies such as those of Chen, Narasimhan, and Zhang (2001) and Janssen and
Parakhonyak (2013), in which price-matching guarantees potentially allow consumers who
would otherwise remain relatively uninformed to pay a lower listed price. Our findings ap-
pear to us more cogent because individuals who find search costly are likely to find satisfy-
ing the non-pecuniary requirements that many firms impose on price-matching customers
costly as well, so we would not expect such individuals to rely on price-matching guar-
antees (one might for instance suppose that in addition to paying search cost c, all non-
shoppers find price-matching a hassle, though this is unnecessary because non-shoppers
observe a single price in equilibrium). Conversely, an individual who does not find the use
of a price-matching guarantee a hassle is also likely to be an individual who is willing to
shop around for price.
More generally, Proposition 3 tells us that the greater the proportion of shoppers who in-
voke price-matching guarantees, the higher the price that any consumer is likely to face.
This is consistent with the experimental results of Dugar and Sorensen (2006), who find
that as the number of positive hassle cost buyers in the market is reduced, average market
price approaches the monopoly price in a monotonic fashion. The next proposition says
that when θS = 0that is, all shoppers invoke price-matching guarantees when they are
availableprice-matching leads to a unique monopolistic equilibrium.
21The only potential benefit accrues to deal-prone shoppers who invoke price-matching guarantees in
terms of any intrinsic value that they derive from the deal.
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Proposition 4. Suppose that firms are exogenously required to offer price-matching guar-
antees and θS = 0. Then there exists a unique Sequential Equilibrium where both firms set
price v and r∗1 = r
∗
2 = v + c.
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Intuitively, when θS = 0, lower prices do not attract additional customers. In particu-
lar, shoppers who encounter a higher price at the second firm they search will use a price-
matching guarantee at the second firm rather than go back to the first firm to obtain a
lower price. As a result, firms extract all consumer welfare by pricing at v.
At the opposite extreme, when θS = 1, no one invokes price-matching guarantees. In this
case, if we set βS = βN = 1/2 and substitute θS = 1 into Equations (2.3) and firms' price
distribution functions in Proposition 2, we obtain respectively, firms' profits and price dis-
tributions in the subgame without matching. Proposition 3 shows that the distribution
when θS = 1 is strictly dominated by any symmetric distribution where some shoppers
invoke price-matching guarantees. This immediately leads to the following result:
Corollary 1. In a symmetric equilibrium where both firms offer price-matching guarantees
and some shoppers invoke them, expected prices and profits are higher than in an equilib-
rium without price-matching.
2.4.3 Only Firm 1 Price-Matches
In this subsection we examine equilibria that arise when firm 1 is exogenously required to
offer price-matching guarantees while firm 2 is required not to. The analysis when only
firm 2 is exogenously required to offer price-matching guarantees is analogous.
22We note that the assumption of costless first visits is not innocuous here. Janssen, Moraga-Gonzàlez,
and Wildenbeest (2005) show that when non-shoppers have to pay for every price quote, full participation,
which is presumed here, requires v to be no lower than firms' reservation prices.
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Proposition 5. Suppose that firm 1 is exogenously required to offer price-matching guar-
antees while firm 2 is required not to and that all consumers are indifferent regarding which







(1− µ) (1− βN)
µ [(1− βS) θS + βS] + (1− µ) (1− βN)
}
, min {v, r∗}
]




r (µ, θS, c, βS, βN) if r (µ, θS, c, βS, βN) ≤ v∞ otherwise ,
r(µ, θS, c, βS, βN) = c{1− (1− µ)(1− βN)
µ[(1− βS)θS + βS] × ln{1 +
µ[(1− βS)θS + βS]
(1− µ)(1− βN) }}
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with a mass point at p¯. In equilibrium, the expected prices for the two firms
equal each other.
As in the equilibria described in Proposition 2, non-shoppers randomly choose a firm to
search first and make a purchase there. We continue our focus on equilibria where shop-
pers randomly choose their initial price sample (βS = 1/2). When βS = 1/2, it must be
that βN < 1/2implying that more non-shoppers purchase from the non-matching firm.
Suppose this were not the case. Then, firm 1, which offers price-matching guarantees, ex-
pects to sell to more shoppers than firm 2, and to at least as many non-shoppers. But this
would lead firm 1 to place greater probability on higher prices than firm 2, breaking the
equality between reservation prices (or alternatively, expected prices) needed to make con-
sumers indifferent between which firm to sample first.
Even assuming βS = 1/2, the equilibrium value of βN cannot be solved for explicitly as
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a function of µ and θS by using expected price equality E1 [p] = E2 [p] (the expressions
for E1 [p] and E2 [p] are written in full in the proof of Proposition 5 in the Supplemental
Appendix). However, because E1 [p] and E2 [p] are both smooth functions in µ and θS,
we are able to verify existence of an equilibrium value of βN ∈ [0, 1/2) numerically on a
grid. To do so, we compute βN for 10,000 (µ, θS) pairs spaced evenly over the parameter
space µ × θS ⊂ (0, 1) × (0, 1). We employ this approach in Figures 2.1 through 2.4.23
The shaded region in Figure 2.1 represents the set of µ and θS such that βS = 1/2 and
the equilibrium described in Proposition 5 exists, whereas Figure 2.4(a) displays the value
of βN that leads to equilibrium for each of the (µ, θS) pairs in Figure 2.1. Figure 2.4(a)
makes apparent that βN ∈ [0, 1/2), and moreover that βN increases in θS, but decreases in
µ. When θS grows or µ shrinks, firm 1's ability to maintain higher prices via shoppers who
invoke price-matching guarantees diminishes. In equilibrium, βN must then grow to make
consumers indifferent between which firm to sample first.









Figure 2.1: Set of µ and θS Such That Equilibrium With βS = 0.5 and βN ∈ (0, 0.5)
Exists When Only Firm 1 Matches.





r (µ, θS, c, βS, βN)
Figure 2.2: (a) βN and (b) r (µ, θS, c, βS, βN)
Because firm 2 has a mass point at p¯, it may be thought of as running fewer sales than
firm 1for instance, p¯ may be interpreted as a manufacturer's suggested retail price and a
discount from that price could be called a sale. However, even though firm 2 runs sales less
frequently than firm 1, because expected prices are equal in equilibrium, when firm 2 does
run sales, it will tend to offer greater discounts than firm 1. In the next section, we will
consider how firm profits (and hence expected prices) in the equilibria of this subsection
compare to profits when neither or both firms price-match.
Proposition 6 represent the comparative static counterpart to Proposition 3 when only
firm 1 offers a price-matching guarantee.
Proposition 6. Suppose that firm 1 is exogenously required to offer price-matching guar-
antees while firm 2 is required not to, βS = 1/2, and βN ∈ (0, 1/2).
1. Then in equilibrium, for firm 1 a price distribution with a lower proportion of shop-
pers, µ, dominates one with a higher proportion in the sense of first-order stochas-
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tic dominance if and only if ∂βN
∂µ
> − 1−βN
µ(1−µ) . A distribution with a lower proportion
of shoppers who ignore price-matching guarantees, θS, dominates one with a higher




. Moreover, expected prices for both firms
are decreasing in µ if and only if ∂βN
∂µ
> − 1−βN






2. If r∗ < v, then r∗ is decreasing in µ if and only if ∂βN
∂µ
> − 1−βN
µ(1−µ) and decreasing in






By applying the implicit function theorem to E1 [p]− E2 [p] = 0, we can determine ∂βN∂µ and
∂βN
∂θS
. Unfortunately, this yields a pair of highly unwieldy equations, and as an alternative,
we numerically compute the reservation price over the set of µ and θS for which an equi-
librium of the type described in Proposition 5 exists (the shaded region in Figure 2.1) to
determine whether or not the inequalities in Proposition 6 hold. These computations are
displayed in Figure 2.2(b), which shows the equilibrium reservation price decreasing over
all µ and θS, as in Proposition 3, Part (2). Because r (µ, θS, c, βS, βN) is a smooth func-
tion in µ and θS, Figure 2.2(b) tells us that the inequalities in Proposition 6 always hold in
the shaded region in Figure 2.1, so that the equilibrium reservation price is increasing with
the proportion of shoppers who invoke price-matching guarantees and moreover, according
to Proposition 6, Part (1), so is the expected price.
Although our focus thus far has been on equilibria where consumers who have no price in-
formation are indifferent between which firm to sample first, as can be observed in Figure
2.1, assuming βS = 1/2, there is a subset of µ and θS where such an equilibrium does not
exist. In Proposition 7, we characterize the equilibrium that prevails throughout the re-
mainder of the µ × θS parameter space when βS = 1/2. We then show that the equilibria
characterized in Propositions 5 and 7 partition this space.
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Proposition 7. Suppose that firm 1 is exogenously required to offer price-matching guar-
antees while firm 2 is required not to and βS = 1/2.
1. An equilibrium in which non-shoppers all prefer to sample firm 1 first does not exist.
2. For sufficiently low θS and sufficiently high µ, there exists an equilibrium where all









2− µ (1− θS)
]
, min {v, r∗2}
]
and the equilibrium reservation, r∗2, equals
r∗2 =
r2 (µ, θS, c) if r2 (µ, θS, c) ≤ v∞ otherwise ,










2− µ (1− θS) − 1
}−1
Firm 1 distributes prices according to
F1 (p) =
2− µ (1− θS)





while firm 2 distributes prices according to










with a mass point at p¯. In equilibrium, firm 1's reservation price and ex-
pected price is no lower than those of firm 2.
Regarding Part (1), we already knew that when βS = 1/2, it must be that βN < 1/2, so
we should not expect an equilibrium where non-shoppers all prefer to sample firm 1 first
to exist (which would imply βN = 1). With regard to Part (2), it is worth noting that
the price distributions in Proposition 7 are the limits of the price distributions in Propo-
sition 5 as βN → 0, holding βS = 1/2. Additionally, assuming that v is not binding, in
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equilibrium, r1 (µ, θS, c) equals
r1 (µ, θS, c) = c+ r2 (µ, θS, c)
2 (1− µ)
µ (1 + θS)
ln
[




As a consequence, r1 (µ, θS, c) > r2 (µ, θS, c) occurs if and only if
c > r2 (µ, θS, c)
{
1− 2 (1− µ)
µ (1 + θS)
ln
[




where it can be observed that c divided by the bracketed expression in the right hand
side of Inequality (2.7) is the limit of the equilibrium reservation price in Proposition 5
as βN → 0, holding βS = 1/2. This means that when βS = 1/2, the equilibria in Proposi-
tions 5 and 7 partition the space µ× θS ⊂ (0, 1)× (0, 1). That is, when shopper sampling
order is random in an equilibrium where only firm 1 offers to price-match, non-shoppers
are either indifferent regarding which firm to sample first or they strictly prefer to sample
firm 2 first. In the latter case, Equation (2.4) indicates that non-shoppers expect to pay a
lower price at the non-matching firm, so that for a subset of parameters, the non-matching
firm behaves like a low price competitor to its price-matching rival.24
2.5 Market Equilibrium
In the first stage of the game, firms must decide whether or not to make a price-matching
announcement. For each firm, this decision depends on a comparison of the profits that
it expects to obtain in each of the pricing subgames discussed in the previous section. In
this section, we continue to focus on equilibria where βS = 1/2; that is, shoppers ran-
domly choose which firm's price to sample first before moving on to the second firm. This
24The claims proving Proposition 1 in the Supplemental Appendix suggest that when βN = 0, ad-
ditional equilibria may exist on the set µ × θS when the assumption regarding consumer indifference is
omitted from the proposition. These equilibria can be ruled out numerically. For instance, if firm 1 is the
matching firm and βN = 0, Proposition 1 sans the indifference assumption posits an equilibrium in which
r2 < r1 in which both firms have a mass point at the upper bound of their supports. However, numeri-
cally, we have found that for any value of Pr (p2 = p¯2) ∈ (0, 1), r1 < r2 in such an equilibrium, a contra-
diction (additional detail is available upon request from the authors). Thus, when βS = 1/2, we need only
to concentrate on the equilibria described in Propositions 5 and 7.
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follows naturally if shoppers observe either that both firms offer price-matching guaran-
tees, or that neither one does, in which case there is no information about the prices of the
individual firms to be gleaned from the first stage. However, even if one firm announces
its guarantee to match the other firm's price, while the other does not, at the end of their
search, shoppers will nevertheless procure the lowest price available, so that randomization
is a reasonable search strategy. Going forward, we assume that v is large enough not to
be binding on firm supports (and thus, as a result of Proposition 4, we must assume that
θS 6= 0).
Fortunately, when βS = 1/2, because the stage-two pricing equilibria when both firms
make the same stage-one matching decision are symmetric, as displayed in the payoff ma-
trix labeled Table 2.1, our analysis boils down to a pair of profit comparisons over the set
µ × θS: (i) a comparison of the matching firm's expected profit when only one firm of-
fers a price-matching guarantee E piMNM = Epi
NM
M against the symmetric expected profit
when neither firm price-matches E piNN , and (ii) a comparison of the non-matching firm's
expected profit when only one firm offers a price-matching guarantee E piMNN = E pi
NM
N
against the symmetric expected profit when both firms price-match E piMM . Because all
expected profit functions are smooth, we can follow the approach of Chen, Narasimhan,
and Zhang (2001) by numerically comparing the difference between E piNN and E piMNM as
well as the difference between E piMNN and E pi
MM over the range of relevant parameters
in this case, parameter space µ×θSto derive all possible equilibria of the complete game.
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Table 2.1: Stage-One Profit Comparison
Match Don't Match
Match E piMM , E piMM E piMNM , E pi
MN
N
Don't Match E piNMN , E pi
NM
M E pi
NN , E piNN
As should be expected from Figure 2.1, the expressions for the expected profits of firms
in equilibria where only one firm offers a price-matching guarantee vary depending on
whether non-shoppers are indifferent regarding which firm to sample first (as in Proposi-
tion 5) or all prefer to sample the non-matching firm first (as in Proposition 7). Suppose
that, only firm 1 announces a price-matching guarantee. The expected profits of firm 1 in
these two cases are respectively,
E piMNM =
2 (1− µ) (1− βN) [µ+ (1− µ) βN ] p¯MN
2 (1− µ) (1− βN) + µ (1 + θS) , (2.8)
E piMN˜M =
2µ (1− µ) p¯MN˜
2− µ (1− θS) (2.9)
where the superscript MN (MN˜) refers to equilibria where non-shoppers are indiffer-
ent regarding which firm to sample first (prefer to sample the non-matching firm first).
In contrast, the symmetric expected profit when neither firm price-matches is E piNN =
(1− µ) p¯NN/2.
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Figure 2.3: E piNN − E piMNM over µ× θS ⊂ (0, 1)× (0, 1) (assuming c = 1).
Figure 2.3 maps the difference between E piNN and E piMNM (or E pi
MN˜
M as appropriate) over
parameter space µ × θS. From the figure, it can be observed that E piMNM (or E piMN˜M as
appropriate) is always greater than E piNN in the interior of µ × θS: that is, the price-
matching firm never wants to deviate to not matching when its rival does not match (or
conversely, the situation where neither firm matches is not an equilibrium of the complete
game). Moreover, as the figure makes evident, the difference in profit grows in the propor-
tion of shoppers who invoke price-matching guarantees. The one exception to E piMNM , E pi
MN˜
M >
E piNN occurs when θS = 1. In this case, even though a firm may offer a price-matching
guarantee, consumers do not invoke it, and as a result, consumer search and firm pricing
are precisely the same as if price-matching were not an option.
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Figure 2.4: µ × θS ⊂ (0, 1) × (0, 1): (a) Shaded Region Implies E piMNN − E piMM ≥ 0 ;
(b) E piMM − E piMNN or E piMM − E piMN˜N (assuming c = 1).
Like Figure 2.3, Figure 2.4(a), which compares the expected profit of the non-matching
firm when only one firm offers a price-matching guarantee with the symmetric expected
profit when both firms price-match, shows that price-matching is usuallythough not
alwaysa best response to a competitor's price-matching announcement. The non-matching
firm analogues of Equations (2.8) and (2.9) are respectively, E piMNN = 2 (1− µ) (1− βN) p¯MN











we observe that with the exception of a small region in which both µ and θS are close to
1, E piMM is greater than E piMNN (or E pi
MN˜
N as appropriate) over µ × θS.25 In particular,
with regard to equilibria where non-shoppers prefer to sample the non-matchingand in
25Smoothness of the profit functions thereby implies a subset of parameter values over which one firm
strictly prefers to price-match while the other firm is indifferent between offering and not offering price-
matching guarantees. The subset is a curve that partitions µ× θS .
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that case, lower expected pricefirm, Figure 2.4(a) tells us that because for most µ and
θS, E pi
MM > E piMN˜N , announcing a price-matching guarantee is generally a profitable al-
ternative to being a non-matching, low price competitor to a price-matching firm. Figure
2.4(b), which maps the actual profit difference compared in Figure 2.4(a), shows that the
difference is decreasing in θS. When θS grows, fewer shoppers invoke price-matching guar-
antees, narrowing the distinction between offering and not offering these guarantees.
The following result summarizes the discussion above.26
Market Equilibrium. Suppose that shoppers sample prices at random and θS ∈ (0, 1).
In the equilibrium of the complete game, either both firms will offer price-matching guaran-
tees or only one firm will offer a price-matching guarantee on the equilibrium path. In any
equilibrium outcome where firms are given the option of offering price-matching guaran-
tees, firm profits and expected prices are higher than when price-matching is not an option.
2.6 Asymmetric Equilibria (Numerical Analysis)
Although equilibria where βS = 1/2 are intuitively appealing and mathematically tractable,
because βS and βN are endogenously determined, equilibria where βS 6= 1/2 also exist,
even if both firms announce an intent to price-match on the equilibrium path. Although a
complete investigation of such equilibria would be quite lengthy, they warrant some discus-
sion, particularly when only a single firm announces an intent to price-match. To simplify
the exposition, we restrict the discussion to equilibria where non-shoppers are indifferent
regarding which firm to sample first.
26The final sentence in the result below relies on the comparison of EpiNN and EpiMNM along with
Corollary 1.
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Figure 2.5: Both Firms Match and µ = θS = 0.5: (a) Equilibrium βS > 0.5 and βN > 0.5;
(b) Equilibrium Profits (assuming c = 1).
Mathematically, multiple βS and βN pairs may prevail for any combination of the exoge-
nous parameters because in each equilibrium involving subgames played after at least one
firm reveals an intent to price-match, the solution for βS and βN is obtained using the sin-
gle equation that sets the expected prices in the two firms equal to each other, making all
consumers indifferent between which firm to search first. For instance, in the subgame
where both firms offer price-matching guarantees, Figure 2.5(a) shows the set of all equi-
librium βS > 1/2 and βN > 1/2 in the case that µ = θS = 1/2 while Figure 2.5(b) repre-
sents the expected profits of firms 1 and 2 for combinations of βS and βN in Figure 2.5(a).
From 1.5(b), we can observe that as the equilibrium becomes more asymmetric from the
standpoint that the absolute value difference between βN and 1 − βN increases, so do the
profits of the two firms. Table 2.2 presents additional evidence of profits rising with the
amount of asymmetry in the subgame where both firms offer price-matching guarantees for
various combinations of µ and θS. In particular, for each combination of µ and θS, both
firms' expected profits are higher when βN = 0.55 (and βS is endogenously determined
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accordingly) than when βN = 0.5, assuming an equilibrium where non-shoppers are in-
different regarding which firm to sample first exists when βN = 0.55. Likewise, expected
profits are higher when βN = 0.6 than when βN = 0.55.
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Table 2.2: Firm Profits When Both Firms Matcha, b
βN = 0.50 βN = 0.55 βN = 0.60 βS = 0.999
µ θS pi1 = pi2 pi1 pi2 pi1 pi2 pi1 pi2
.20 .20 10.75 10.79 11.75 N/A N/A 10.80 12.03
.50 .20 3.12 3.15 3.37 3.18 3.62 3.24 4.32
.80 .20 1.06 1.09 1.13 1.11 1.20 1.23c 1.71c
.20 .50 4.27 N/A N/A N/A N/A 4.29 4.59
.50 .50 1.19 1.20 1.29 1.22 1.38 1.23 1.46
.80 .50 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.37 0.40 0.42 0.57
.20 .80 2.65 N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.66 2.73
.50 .80 0.71 0.72 0.77 N/A N/A 0.72 0.77
.80 .80 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.23
aµ consumers have no cost of search (shoppers), while 1 − µ have search cost
c = 1 (non-shoppers). θS shoppers always ignore price-matching guarantees. βS
and βN respectively represent the fraction of shoppers and non-shoppers who
begin search at firm 1. Non-shoppers' valuation for the good is assumed to be
strictly higher than their equilibrium reservation price.
bEquilibrium βS varies with µ and θS for a given value of βN and vice versa.
N/A implies that an equilibrium where non-shoppers are indifferent regarding
which firm to sample first does not exist for the given value of βN . Rightmost
column gives results for βS = 0.999 to approximate profits with highest level of
asymmetry.
cNo equilibrium with βS = 0.999. Results given are for βN = 0.999 and
βS = 0.80.
27Moreover, as might be expected from Proposition 3, Table 2.2 suggests that expected profits decrease
in µ and θS for each realization of βN .
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When βN , βS > 1/2, as can be inferred from Equation (2.3), firm 1 will capture a higher
proportion of non-shoppers while firm 2 expects to capture more shoppers. Firm 1 sets
higher prices and has fewer sales than in the symmetric case because when it serves a
higher proportion of non-shoppers, it loses more profit from these captive consumers when-
ever it lowers its price. Even though firm 2 has fewer non-shoppers than in the symmetric
case, it will tend to have higher prices as well because it no longer needs to lower prices as
much to have the same probability of capturing the bulk of the shoppers as it did in the
symmetric case. Thus, both firms have higher prices and expected profits than in the sym-
metric case.
Intuitively, an asymmetric equilibrium may result in the presence of price-matching be-
cause more shoppers may prefer to purchase at a particular firm (and so first sample the
price of its rival), but are lexicographic, valuing a purchase at a lower price over a pur-
chase at a preferred firm. Price-matching will allow some shoppers to purchase at a pre-
ferred firm at the lower price even when that firm does not list the lower price. For in-
stance, if firm 2 ends up setting the higher price ex-post, µβS (1− θS) shoppers neverthe-
less purchase there. The higher βS, the greater the number of shoppers that end up mak-
ing a purchase at firm 2. Ex-ante, given µ and θS, firms set prices to make non-shoppers
indifferent between which firm to sample. A higher βS entails a higher βN in order that
Equation (2.4) may hold.
Table 2.3, which corresponds to Table 2.2 for a subgame with a single matching firm, also
suggests that expected profits are increasing in the absolute value difference between βN
and 1 − βN for both the matching and non-matching firm. In Section 2.5 we learned that
when βS = 1/2, price-matching (whether by one firm or both) always led to higher firm
profits and prices relative to a regime where price-matching is forbidden. Tables 2.2 and
2.3 suggest that asymmetry in the search behavior of consumers will exacerbate these ef-
fects. Moreover, because we know that shoppers always obtain the lowest price in equilib-
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rium whereas non-shoppers never invoke price-matching guarantees, firm profit increases
must come at the expense of consumer welfare.
Table 2.3: Firm Profits When Only Firm 2 (Firm 1) Matchesa, b
βN = 0.55(0.45) βN = 0.60(0.40) βS = 0.999(0.001)
µ θS pi1(pi2) pi2(pi1) pi1(pi2) pi2(pi1) pi1(pi2) pi2(pi1)
.20 .20 5.78 6.29 N/A N/A 10.75 11.99
.50 .20 0.71 0.76 0.94 1.07 3.23 4.30
.80 .20 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.45c 0.63c
.20 .50 N/A N/A N/A N/A 4.29 4.58
.50 .50 0.71 0.76 0.94 1.07 1.23 1.46
.80 .50 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.42 0.57
.20 .80 N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.66 2.73
.50 .80 0.71 0.76 N/A N/A 0.72 0.77
.80 .80 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.23
aµ consumers have no cost of search (shoppers), while 1 − µ have search cost
c = 1 (non-shoppers). θS shoppers always ignore price-matching guarantees. βS
and βN respectively represent the fraction of shoppers and non-shoppers who
begin search at firm 1. Non-shoppers' valuation for the good is assumed to be
strictly higher than their equilibrium reservation price.
bEquilibrium βS varies with µ and θS for a given value of βN and vice versa.
N/A implies that an equilibrium where non-shoppers are indifferent regarding
which firm to sample first does not exist for the given value of βN . Rightmost
column gives results for βS = 0.999 (βS = 0.001) to approximate profits with
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highest level of asymmetry.
cNo equilibrium with βS = 0.999 (βS = 0.001). Results given are for βN =
0.999 (βN = 0.001) and βS = 0.657 (βS = 0.343).
From Section 2.4, we know that when βS = 1/2, beliefs regarding βN must vary on and
off the equilibrium path because whereas the unique value of βN is 1/2 when either both,
or neither firm announces an intent to price-match, as seen in Figure 2.2(a), it turns out
that βN 6= 1/2 when one firm offers a price-matching guarantee while the other does not.
In a subgame where both firms price-match, consumers cannot make any inference about
firm pricing behavior ahead of the search process, so that randomization regarding the first
sample seems to be the most reasonable approach. This is not necessarily the case after
consumers have observed firms making opposite matching decisions. Thus, it seems sensi-
ble to think that beliefs regarding βN might be more symmetric in an equilibrium where
both firms match relative to one where only one does so. An insightful comparison then
arises if we juxtapose the expected profits in the leftmost profit column in Table 2.2 with
the rightmost column in Table 2.3, the former representative of (symmetric) randomization
when both firms match and the latter approximating the highest level of asymmetry that
might arise when only one firm matches. Among the (µ, θS) pairs in the two tables, we
observe that only in the case of µ = 0.80 and θS = 0.20, is expected profit higher when
both firms offer price-matching guarantees. As such, within the context of this model,
there are two ways to interpret the real world observation that only a fraction of the firms
producing the same good tend to offer price-matching guarantees: (i) most consumers are
shoppers who do not invoke price-matching guarantees28 or (ii) firms that choose not to
price-match believe that a more symmetric (and potentially less profitable) equilibrium
might prevail were they to offer price-matching guarantees.
28This interpretation proceeds from Figure 2.4(a), which shows that when βS = 1/2 in all subgames,
both firms offer price-matching guarantees in equilibrium unless µ and θS are both very high.
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2.7 Conclusion
This article explores the effects that price-matching guarantees have on firms and con-
sumers when consumers optimally search for price after learning firms' price-matching
policies. Price-matching guarantees alter the shopping behavior of both types of consumers
in our model in a way that encourages firms to raise prices. When consumers who have no
cost of price search invoke price-matching guarantees at firms that list higher prices, firms
are discouraged from lowering prices in order to attract such consumers. Understanding
this price-increasing effect, consumers who face an opportunity cost of searching for price
accept higher prices at already sampled firms because they anticipate that further search
is less likely to yield a lower price. In addition, because consumers with no search costs
may be able to obtain the lower price at either firm, there is a multiplicity of asymmetric
equilibria where more asymmetry leads to higher expected prices and firm profits.
While the underlying mechanism driving the effects of price-matching in our model is new,
this article is not orthogonal to the previous literature. The effect that price-matching has
on consumer search leads to both welfare diminishing tacit collusion and price discrimi-
nation. Tacit collusion occurs because firms understand that a rival's threat to match a
lower price entails a smaller benefit from any incremental price cut. This threat increases
the greater the percentage of consumers who have observed both prices that invokes price-
matching guarantees. Price discrimination occurs because consumers who have no cost of
price search may use a price-match to secure a lower price from the firm listing the higher
price while the firm's remaining customers pay the higher listed price. However, contrary
to the result in signaling models of price-match, where ex-ante asymmetries persist ex-
post, we find that price-matching alone is enough to generate an asymmetric equilibrium.
In the model presented, asymmetries increase firm profits at the expense of consumer wel-
fare, but it would be interesting to see how differences in firm production costs or brand-
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ing influence search behavior when price-matching guarantees are in place. This is not im-
mediately obvious from the above analysis. Ex-ante asymmetries have the potential to re-
duce asymmetries ex-post, but it is unclear if this is a good thing because it may entail
more purchases from the higher cost firm.29
This study has implications for future empirical work. Recent empirical literature has
focused primarily on comparisons of price observations between firms with and without
price-matching guarantees and arrived at opposite results (Moorthy and Winter 2006; Ar-
batskaya, Hviid, Shaffer 2006). The results in this article suggest that such cross-sectional
findings point purely to underlying cost or other differences between firms without telling
us the overall welfare effect of adopting a matching policy. Under most combinations of
parameters, the expected prices among otherwise homogeneous firms that differ in the
adoption of a price-matching guarantee remain the same in our model. This suggests that
what is really necessary is a welfare comparison of firms over timebefore any have adopted
price-matching policies, and after some or all have (see Hess and Gerstner 1991); although
even this may not be foolproof, as the adoption of a matching policy may follow a change
in production costs.
A survey test of our model could ask individuals who use price-matching guarantees to se-
cure the lowest price if they would obtain that price regardless by purchasing somewhere
else. An affirmative answer would validate the model by telling us that price-matching
guarantees can keep consumers out of firms with lower listed prices.
29In an experimental study, Biswas et al. (2002) find that when consumers have preconceived notions
of a store's price image, low-price guarantees may lead to heightened (lowered) intentions to sample the
prices of other stores when the price image is high (low). In another, Mago and Pate (2009) show that







Economists have studied the effects of product complexity on market structure for some
time. There is a wide variety of papers that explore the consequences of complexity on
such topics as international trade, innovation, and firm organization. However, all of these
models treat complexity as an artifact of the good's creation; more complex goods are
those which are more difficult or complicated to produce. In other words, economists have
considered complexity solely from the point of view of the producer. In this paper I in-
vestigate another form of complexity which stems from the variation in consumers' pref-
erences over the god. From this perspective, some goods, like forks, are simple. What
consumers want from them is straightforward and there are not many different ways to
achieve that goal. Preferences over other goods, like automobiles, are complex because
consumers want many things from them which can be delivered in a variety of distinct
ways.
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To distinguish technical complexity from Preference complexity, consider food products.
Typically, food products are technically simple, but preference-complex. There is a great
variety of characteristics that consumers care about in their food including the taste, health
value, presentation, and ethical consequences of the production of their food, and each of
these properties can be broken down into numerous sub categories. Health value, for in-
stance, can be divided into fat content, cholesterol content, sodium content, as well as the
presence of a variety of allergens. All of these characteristics apply to a good as techni-
cally simple as bread, which has been produced for thousands of years. For the rest of the
paper, assume that complexity refers to preference complexity unless otherwise noted.
Consider the markets for milk and cheese. Whereas these goods are overall similar, there
are many, many more individual varieties of cheese for sale than varieties of milk. A simi-
lar observation can be made about the markets for flour and bread. I argue that the most
salient inherent difference in the markets for milk and cheese is the fact that cheese is
much more complex. In this paper I make the case that more complex goods generate a
greater variety of products in equilibrium. While it seems immediate to claim that more
potential products should lead to more actual products, there's no guarantee that the de-
mand will exist for all of the individual varieties. In section 4 I provide evidence that in-
creasing the complexity of a good raises the price of all of the products in the market, al-
lowing more to coexist in equilibrium.
To get this result, I embed a characteristic space (Lancaster 1966) inside a model of spa-
tial competition. This creates a hypercube over which a number of firms compete, similar
to the framework used by Irmen and Thisse (Irmen and Thisse 1998). Then the complex-
ity of the product space can be represented by the number of dimensions of the hypercube.
While Irmen and Thisse find that the number of dimensions in their model is largely ir-
relevant, this is a direct result of only studying a duopoly. I allow many firms to operate
simultaneously and compare the nature of their competition as I vary the dimension of the
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space. Because this model is the first to study the decisions of more than two firms com-
peting over more than one dimension, I initially restrict attention to an exogenous location
pricing game.
I find that the behavior of the model is markedly different from standard Hotelling models.
Neither the principle of minimum differentiation (Hotelling 1929) or principle of maximum
differentiation from (d'Aspremonte et. al. 1979) hold. In addition, I find that firms' prices
decline directly in the number of their neighbors. I obtain these unusual results because
my model allows for interactions between a firm's competition with each of its neighbors.
In other multi-firm Hotelling models, such as the circular road (Salop 1979) or the hyper-
pyramid (Von Ungern-Sternberg 1991), consumers live only on the edges between firms, so
the results of competition have no direct effect on each other. Finally, when I relax the as-
sumption of exogenous location on a square, I find that the standard location choice game
for four firms does not have a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and provides
a brief example. The basic case of the model is solved in section 3. An alternate speci-
fication of the model, useful for interdimensional comparisons, is solved in Section 4. In
section 5, I depart from my previous work to study an endogeonus location model in 2 di-
mensions. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 The Model
The model I study is a variant of Hotelling's famous model. Hotelling conceived of the sin-
gle axis of competition in his original model as location along a main street in a town.
Most recent uses of Hotellings model have reimagined the axis of competition as a mea-
sure of product differentiation along a single characteristic. The model I study poses the
question of what happens when firms compete over many characteristics of a good simulta-
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neously and whether or not the number of individual characteristic is important.
There exists a good with n characteristics. As an example, consider pizza with its charac-
teristics Thin crust vs. deep dish and greasy vs. non-greasy. Each of these can be nor-
malized to a spectrum [0,1] and varied independently of each other. Then, every possible
type of pizza can be represented by a square. More generally, I look at an n-cube defined
by Z = [0, 1]n. In order to exploit the high degree of inherent symmetry in a cube, I as-
sume that 2n symmetric firms compete on Z. Order the firms arbitrarily and label them
firm 1 through firm 2n. To avoid confusion, a good refers to the total market, where a
product is a specific instance of the good given by a particular location vector.
There is a mass of consumers, normalized without loss to 1, distributed uniformly across
the interior of the hypercube, with their location giving the exact configuration of the
good that they most prefer. Consumers suffer quadratic disutility from consuming a prod-
uct that deviates from their ideal with a standard, Euclidean notion of distance. Each
agent purchases exactly one good from one of the firms. An agent located at x receives
indirect utility according to ux(y, p) from purchasing good y at price p.




Above, t denotes equivalently the size of the hypercube or the intensity of preferences,
while the summation is merely the square of the Euclidean distance from x to y. An agent
at x will prefer firm A to firm B if and only if ux(A, pA) ≥ ux(B, pB).
Let firm i be located at point zi and charge price pi. Define p = (p1, p2, p3...) as the vector
of prices. The set of consumers that purchase from firm i is given by the set of consumers
that individually prefer firm i to each other firm j. Define
Si(p) := {y ∈ Z| pi + t
n∑
k=1
(zik − yk)2 ≤ pj + t
n∑
k=1
(zjk − yk)2 ∀j}
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Then the demand of firm i, Di(p) is the volume of this set, or Di(p) = V (Si(p)). It does
not matter whether or not Si is defined through weak or strict preference, as the set of in-
different consumers has no volume as long as firms are distinct. I assume that any product
may be produced at the same constant marginal cost, which is normalized to zero without
loss of generality, so the firms' profit function is given by pii(p) = piDi(p).
Since all firms are ex-ante symmetric and competing in a symmetric environment, I wish
to restrict attention to symmetric equilibria. Towards that end, assume that firms position
themselves in a reflectively symmetric arrangement.
Definition 1. An set of points A = {zi}2n is called reflectively symmetric if ∀i,j∃zk∈A such




j−1, 1− zij, zij+1, ...zin).
If a set of points is reflectively symmetric, the position of all other points is uniquely de-
termined by the position of a single point. Call that point z1. Any reflectively symmetric
set of points containing z1 can be alternately defined by
∏n
i=1{z1i , 1 − z1i }, the set of every




i = 1 − z1i . For example, when n=2, every reflec-
tively symmetric positioning can be characterized by ((a, b), (1−a, b), (1−a, 1−b), (a, 1−b))
for some a and b. Geometrically speaking, points in a reflectively symmetric arrangement
form a hyperrectangle, invariant to reflections over the coordinates.
Notice that z1i <
1
2
if and only if 1 − zii > 12 . Then if I bisect each coordinate of the cube
to create 2n subcubes, exactly one point from each reflectively symmetric set of points will
fall into each subcube. Relabel the point closest to the origin to be z1 such that z1 ≤ 1
2
.
Like every point in a reflectively symmetric set, z1 will have n neighbors that differ from it
in only one coordinate. The distance between any two neighbors, or the side length of the
hyperrectangle that the set defines, will be δj = 1− 2z1j for the relevant coordinate j.
For most of the paper, with the exception of section 5, I will assume an exogenous loca-
tion. Firms are forced to locate in some reflectively symmetric positioning which can be
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summarized by the representative member, z1. In the next section, I will solve a simple
example in this model to give the reader a clear notion of how the model works.
3.2.1 An Example
Take n=2, t=1. Four firms locate in a reflectively symmetric manner on a square. Let
their positioning be defined by z1 = (0, 0), so that firms position on the vertices of the
square. Due to symmetry, it suffices to solve the problem of a single firm. Without loss
of generality, consider firm 1. It is safe to assume that all other firms are choosing a uni-
form price, p. The set of consumers indifferent between firm 1 and firm 2, located at point
(1, 0), is given by the equation (3.1), which simplifies to (3.2).
p1 + (x1 − 0)2 + (x2 − 0)2 = p+ (1− x1)2 + (x2 − 0)2 (3.1)
x1 =
1− p1 + p
2
(3.2)
Both x1 and x2 must be weakly positive to lie in Z. To lie in S1(p), a point (x1, x2) must
satisfy 3 constraints, one for each of firm 1's competitors. In the set of constraints that
define S1(p) below, the first three are the constraints from firms located at (1,0), (0,1),
and (1,1) respectively.
x1 ≤ 1− p1 + p
2
x2 ≤ 1− p1 + p
2






Figure 3.1: Possible shapes of S1 − S4
There are three possible configurations for S1(p) presented by Figure 3.1. Represented
from left to right are the cases in which firm 1 charges a higher, equal, or lower price rel-
ative to the other three.
As you can see, the formula determining V (S1(p)) depends on whether or not p1 < p.
If p1 < p : D1(p) =





If p1 ≥ p : D1(p) = (1− p1 + p)
2
4
Recall that firm 1's profit is given by pi1(p) = piDi(p). Since the expressions are the
same when p = p1, the profit function is certainly continuous, but it is possibly non-
differentiable at p = p1, which must hold in equilibrium. For now, assume that the func-
tion is differentiable. In order to solve for p1, I take the derivative of the profit function,
set it equal to zero, and then impose that p = p1. Although there may be different ex-
pressions for the right and left hand derivatives at p = p1, differentiability assures us that
they are equivalent. I use the right hand derivative for our calculations since it is simpler.





Consider a product space with n characteristics. There are 2n firms. In a symmetric equi-






... hypercube that con-
tains them.
Lemma 1. The profit function, pij(p) is everywhere differentiable in p1.
Proof. See Appendix B.
I'd like to take a moment to discuss the general strategy of finding equilibria in this envi-
ronment. Because I am interested in symmetric equilibria, I can assume that all firms are
choosing the same price and then consider the problem of a potential deviant. Without
loss, I can assume that the potential deviant is firm 1, located closest to the origin. Then,
I must find firm 1's profit function in terms of the candidate price, p, and his deviation,
p1. Due to the differentiability of the profit function, I always assume that the price of the
firm whose problem is being considered is greater than or equal to the price of other firms,
as this greatly simplifies the expressions involved. Knowing the profit function, I can take
the first order condition with respect to p1, then set p = p1 and solve to find the equilib-
rium price.
The only difficult part of this process is finding an expression for D1(p). Recall that S1(p)




(xk − z1k)2 ≤ pj + t
n∑
k=1
(xk − zjk)2 (3.3)
zjk can take one of two forms: either z
1
k, or (1 − z1k). Letting Ij = {k ∈ |z1k − zjk 6= 0}, I can
simplify (3.3) to (3.4), and further to (3.5) with a change of variables.
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0 ≤ pj − p1 + t
∑
i∈Ij
(1− 2z1j )− 2(1− 2z1j )xj (3.4)
0 ≤ pj − p1 + t
∑
i∈Ij
δj − 2δjxj (3.5)
In order to find the volume of S1(p) I must to find out which of those constraints are re-
dundant and which bind. Define a type j constraint to be a constraint imposed by a firm k
such that |Ik| = j. Geometrically speaking, type j constraints are imposed by type j firms,
which differ from z1 in j coordinates.
Lemma 2. In equilibrium, only type one constraints bind.
Proof. See Appendix B.
This means that firms only compete directly with their neighbors in equilibrium, so the
region that a firm captures is just a hyperrectangle. Thus, for p1 ≥ p, the profit of firm 1







For a set of number, A, let hm(A) be the harmonic mean of A.
Theorem 1. If 2n firms locate in a reflectively symmetric positioning on an n-cube and
compete in prices, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in which firms charge p∗ =
t hm({δi}ni=1)
n





Proof. See Appendix B.
In general, both prices and profits decrease with dimension. Profits obviously decline in
n, since the same volume must be split among more and more firms. In an n-cube, each
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firm has n neighbors with which it competes directly. More neighbors lead to a decrease
in prices because the measure of consumers that a firm captures from one of its neighbors
interacts positively with the measure of consumers that it captures from each of its other
neighbors. This gives firms a strong incentive to cut prices to expand their market share,
leading to more savage competition and a lower equilibrium price. This effect scales with
each additional direct competitor.
A cursory examination of other multi-firm Hotelling models such as the circular road or
Von Ungern-Sternberg's pyramid shows that the number of firms has no impact on pric-
ing behavior as long as the distance between any two firms is preserved. In those models,
in which consumers only live on one dimensional edges between firms, firms compete in-
dependently with each of their neighbors. More firms are either irrelevant, as in Salop, or
enter the profit function as a linear multiplier, as in Von Ungern-Sternberg.
Note that both prices and profits increase in each δj, the distance between neighbors. As
is common in Hotelling models, firms can charge higher prices whenever they are located
further apart. The δj's cannot be greater than 1, so the reflectively symmetric arrange-
ment that maximizes firm profits is given by z1 = 0, or a firm located on each vertex. Call
this positioning of firms the basic positioning. At first glance, the basic positioning appears
to follow the principle of maximal differentiation, as it represents the arrangement of 2n
firms on an n-cube that maximizes the distance between firms. However, the principle
of maximal differentiation is a statement about equilibrium behavior in a location choice
game and, thus far, I have only worked with an exogenous location game.
3.4 Offsets
In this section I will introduce an alternate positioning so that I can partially divorce the
number of dimensions from the number of firms. I show, using this alternate positioning,
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that there exists an arrangement of 2n firms on an m-cube such that each firm earns more
profits than any firm in any reflectively symmetric positioning of 2n firms on an n-cube
whenever m > n. While increasing the dimensions of the hypercube generally exposes each
firm to more axes of competition which drive prices down, it also allows firms to locate
further from one another, driving prices up. Given the results of this section, the latter
effect dominates.
Consider a collection of m firms on an n-cube in some symmetric positioning, A. In a sym-
metric equilibrium, each firm will earn the same profit, and that profit will be determined
by m, n, and the location of the firms. Let the function p˜i(m,n,A) give such profits.
Proposition 1. There exists an arrangement of firms B such that p˜i(m,n + 1, B)
≥ p˜i(m,n,A).
Proof. To get the result, simply replicate the positioning given by A on one of the n di-
mensional sides of the (n+1)-cube. The regions captured by the firms will be the same as
on the n-cube, but prismed with length 1. Then, firms will face the same profit functions,
make the same decisions and earn the same profit.
With this proposition, I need only show that 2n firms can be made to be strictly better
off in an (n+1)-cube than they can be in an n-cube. Recall that the basic positioning will
generate the most profit of any reflectively symmetric arrangement. In the basic position-
ing, δi = 1 for every i, and so the profit of each firm is given by
t
n2n
. Therefore, it suffices
to construct a positioning of 2n firms on an (n+1)-cube that dominates the basic position-
ing on an n-cube.
The positioning I would like to examine is such that there is a distance of at least
√
2 be-
tween any two firms, or that no firms are neighbors in the sense of the previous section. In
order to do this, position a firm at every vertex zi such that < zi, zi >= 2k for some inte-
ger k. It is easy to verify that this takes exactly 2n firms in an (n+1)-cube. To verify that
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Figure 3.2: The offset positioning on a 3 cube
there are no adjacent firms, note that it's a collection of type 2 k firms for some k. Obvi-
ously a type 2 firm cannot be adjacent to a type 4 firm. If two type 2 firms are distinct,
one of them must have a zero where the other has a 1 and, to compensate, must have a 1
somewhere that the other has a zero. Therefore, we have a positioning of exactly 2n firms
such that no two firms are adjacent. Refer to this arrangement as the offset positioning.
Figure 3.2 shows the offset positioning in three dimensions, with the black dots represent-
ing the location of firms.
Once again, I can appeal to symmetry and consider only the problem of firm 1, located at
the origin, and assume that all other firms charge a uniform price. Suppose that firm 1's
price, p1 is at least as large as the competitors price, p. When p1 ≥ p in the basic case last
section, only type 1 constraints bound. Here, there are no type 1 constraints, and so only
type 2 constraints bind. The argument for this is extremely similar to Proposition 2 from
the last section and is omitted. Type 2 constraints are of the form
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xi ≤ 2t− p1 + p
2t
− xj
Because every type 2 vertex is occupied, there is a constraint of this form for every i,j.
Theorem 2. There exists a symmetric arrangement of 2n firms on an (n+1) cube such
that each firm earns more profit in equilibrium than it is possible for any firm to earn in a
reflectively symmetric equilibrium of 2n firms on an n-cube.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Theorem 2 allows me to compare two markets that differ only in their Preference complex-
ity. Suppose that there are n characteristics of good A and some m > n characteristics of
good B. If the markets have the same number of consumers and the same number of firms
competing, theorem 2 says that each firm in the market for good B ought to make more
profit. Suppose, instead, that there is a uniform fixed cost, F, of entering either market A
or market B. Then, each firm must earn a profit of at least F in equilibrium in order to
survive. Since firms in market B earn more than those in market A, if entry is allowed,
there should be more firms in market B than in market A.
Here, I should clarify what is meant by a firm in this model. Each firm is located at a sin-
gle bundle of characteristics, which means that they sell a product. What the model ac-
tually suggests is that the more complicated a product space is, the more individual prod-
ucts should be observed in equilibrium. This claim can be confirmed by a variety of ob-
servations like the milk/cheese comparison that was made in the introduction. While it is
intuitive to claim that the more kinds of products that are possible, the more should exist,
Theorem 2 provides concrete theoretical grounding for why this should be true even in the
case of fixed demand for the overall good.
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3.5 Endogenous Location
While the dominance of the offset positioning over the basic positioning is indicative that
firms ought to be better off in higher dimensions, it is not a concrete proof. Firms can po-
sition themselves to make higher profits in higher dimensions but it remains to be seen if
they would. Suppose that 2n firms can choose both their price and their location on an n-
cube and on an (n+1)-cube. The natural question is which of the two set ups will yield a
higher profit for firms. Unfortunately, as I will show in this section, the question is gen-
erally unanswerable. There is no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium for four firms on a
square, and no reason to believe that there is such an equilibrium in higher dimensions.
To show that there is no pure strategy symmetric equilibrium, let Z be the square [0, 1]x[0, 1]
and fix t=1. As before, a mass 1 of consumers are uniformly distributed on Z. The utility
of a consumer located at x and purchasing a product from firm located at y that charges
price p is given by ux(y, p) = −d(x, y)2 − p, where d is the Euclidean distance. Each con-
sumer will maximize their utility by purchasing one unit of the good from the firm which
gives them the least disutility.
There are four firms, labeled firm 1 through firm 4. Each firm may choose its location in
Z, zi = (ai, bi), and its price, pi ∈ R+. In the fixed location case, symmetry simply meant
that all firms charged the same price. With endogenous location, I need to extend sym-
metry to location decisions as well. There are two basic ways for four points to exhibit
symmetry on a square. They may be rotationally symmetric, invariant to a rotation of the
square, or reflectively symmetric, invariant to reflections of the square. Given a location
(a,b), there exists a unique rotationally symmetric positioning for the other three firms,
given by h(a, b) = ((a, b), (1 − b, a), (1 − a, 1 − b), (b, 1 − a)). Similarly, for a given (a,b),
g(a, b) = ((a, b), (1− a, b), (1− a, 1− b), (a, 1− b)) provides the unique reflectively symmet-
ric positioning. Given the symmetry of the square, I can assume without loss of generality
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that a ∈ [0, 1
2
], and b ∈ [0, a].
As in the fixed location model, define Ti and pi
e
i such that
Ti(z,p) := {y ∈ Z| pi + d(y, zi) ≤ pj + d(y, zj) ∀j}
piei (z,p) := piV (Ti(z,p))
In this model, a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition 2. A symmetric Nash equilibrium is a vector of prices, (p1, p2, p3, p4), a vector
of locations (z1, z2, z3, z4) and a map F : [0, 1]2 → {1, 2, 3, 4} such that:
1. (z1, z2, z3, z4) = g(z1) or (z1, z2, z3, z4) = h(z1).
2. F(x)=i if ∀j, pi + td(x, zi)2 < pj + td(x, zj)2 and only if ∀j, pi + td(x, zi)2 ≤ pj +
td(x, zj)2.
3. Ti = {y ∈ Z|F (y) = i}.
4. For each i, pi maximizes piV (Ti).
5. pi = pj ∀i,j.
At first, consider only rotationally symmetric equilibria. Any candidate equilibrium can
be summarized by the actions of one firm, since prices are uniform and the location can be
fed through h(.). To check if any candidate equilibrium is actually an equilibrium, I must
find the profit function of a potential deviant in terms of his deviation and the actions of
his competitors according to the candidate. Let the potential equilibrium be (a,b,p) and
the deviation be (aˆ, bˆ, pˆ). If a potential deviant, firm 1 for simplicity, maximizes his profit
at (a,b,p), then (a,b,p) is an equilibrium. In the case of a symmetric allocation, each firm
charges the same price and is located symmetrically about the square, inducing them to
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Figure 3.3: (a) T1 when l1,3 does not bind, (b) T1 when l1,3 binds
split the consumers evenly. Then the profit from any symmetric allocation summarized by
(a,b,p) will simply be p
4
.
T1 is made up of three constraints, one for each of the deviant's competitors. The sets be-
low are the consumers that prefer firm 1 to firms 2, 3, and 4 respectively.
{(x, y) ∈ Z|x ≤ 1 + a
2 − aˆ2 − 2b+ b2 − bˆ2 + p− pˆ− 2ay + 2bˆy
2(1− aˆ− b) } (3.7)
{(x, y) ∈ Z|y ≤ 2 + a
2 − aˆ2 − 2b+ b2 − bˆ2 + p− pˆ− 2a(1− x)− 2x(1− aˆ)
2(1− b− bˆ) } (3.8)
{(x, y) ∈ Z|y ≤ 1 + a
2 − aˆ2 − 2a+ b2 − bˆ2 + p− pˆ− 2aˆx+ 2bx
2(1− a− bˆ) } (3.9)
Call the line of consumers that are indifferent between purchasing from firm 1 and firm 2
(constraint (3.7), but holding with equality) l1,2, and likewise for the other lines of indif-
ference. Figure 3.3 shows the [0, 1]x[0, 1] square from the perspective of the first firm: each
of the constraints represented by l1,j is plotted, bounding the region that firm 1 captures,
T1. Figure 3.3(a) shows the case in which l1,3 is non-binding, while Figure 3 (b) shows the
binding case.
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As indicated by the figure, define the point (α, 0) to be the intersection of l1,4 and the y-
axis. Let the other variables, (β, γ, δ, φ, ω, ρ, σ) be defined similarly in keeping with the
figures1. V (T1) can be derived from basic geometry in each of the cases. In the case in pic-
ture 1, pi1 = pˆV (T1) = pˆ
αγ+βδ
2




superscripts refer to forms of the profit function rather than the profit function for differ-
ent firms.
Clearly the crossover point from the first expression to the second occurs when φ = ρ.
Thus, the full profit function is given by the following:




if ρ ≥ φ,
pˆαφ+ωρ−σφ+βσ
2
if ρ < φ.
(3.10)
Let a triple (a∗, b∗, p∗) be said to be a local (global) maximum at itself with respect to pie
if pie(a∗, b∗, p∗, aˆ, bˆ, pˆ) is maximized locally (globally) over (aˆ, bˆ, pˆ) at (a∗, b∗, p∗).
Then, in this model, a rotationally symmetric pure strategy equilibrium will be a triple,
(a∗, b∗, p∗) that is a global maximum at itself with respect to pie. The process for investi-
gating reflectively symmetric equilibria is similar, but using g(.) to determine the location
of the deviant's competitors rather than h(.). All of the methodology remains the same in
the reflective case.
Theorem 3. There is no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium of this game.
Proof. To show that there are no pure strategy symmetric equilibria in this game, I must
show that there are no pure strategy reflectively symmetric equilibria and also no pure
strategy rotationally symmetric equilibria. In appendix B, I formally prove that there are
no pure strategy rotationally symmetric equilibria. The proof for the reflective case is sim-
ilar.
1Full expressions for (α, β, γ, δ, ρ, σ, φ, ω) as well as the full profit function and calculations are omitted
for clarity, but are available upon request.
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3.6 Conclusions and Extensions
This paper introduces a model of product differentiation that considers the complexity
of a product from a consumer's perspective rather than a firm's. This is the first model
to explicitly model preference complexity and investigate its effect on market structure.
My main result is that in an exogenous location setting, more individual products can be
supported in a more complex product space. In other words, the more potential kinds of
products that can exist in a market, the more products ought to exist in equilibrium. This
result meshes well with stylized facts from many markets. While it makes sense that prod-
ucts with more potential variance ought to support more realized variance, I provide clear
theoretical grounding for this idea.
Further, I find that allowing firms to compete with each other over many axes of product
differentiation radically alters the nature of competition. Unlike previous Hotelling models,
I find that firms' pricing depends on the number of direct competitors because capturing
consumers from one firm has a positive effect on the measure captured from others. I also
find a weak version of the principle of maximum differentiation: that firms would be better
off locating as far from each other as possible, but that firms would not realize that allo-
cation. Investigating a proper, endogenous location version of the model, I find that there
need not be a symmetric, pure strategy equilibrium for more than two firms in more than
one dimension. All of these results combine to call into question the practice of using one
dimensional Hotelling models to characterize competition between many firms in a poten-
tially complex product space.
To extend my work further, I would like to do more with the endogenous location game. If
there is a way to perturb the game so that an equilibrium exists, I could investigate sev-
eral interesting lines of research. Most immediately, I could address whether or not four
firms would be better off competing in two dimensions or one, to generate or negate a
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much more powerful version of the main result of this paper. I suspect that they would
be, as firms in any of the local equilibria of the game that I solved are, in fact, better off
in two dimensions. Further, I could investigate how the equilibrium changes in response
to changing travel costs, or if it's invariant. Lastly it would be interesting to compare ro-
tationally and reflectively symmetric equilibria, to see which is easier to achieve or more
profitable.
To develop the contributions of my framework further, a natural next step is to examine
the effects of coalitions on the pricing behavior and profits of firms in a hypercube set up.
A coalition in this setting would represent either a merger between two firms or a single
firm selling multiple products. If individual firms behave in a qualitatively different way on
a hypercube than they do on a circular road, then it makes sense that coalitions would as
well. Additionally, unlike the circular road, a hypercube framework allows for large coali-
tions that treat every member firm symmetrically.
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Chapter 4
Grandfather Clauses and Consumer
Complacency
4.1 Introduction
A grandfather clause allows a certain group of people to be exempt from a wider change
in circumstances. They are mostly found in legislation, these days often included to reduce
opposition to the changes that a bill imposes from special interests. However, firms have
been known to use grandfather clauses to reward their loyal customers. In economics, this
practice typically takes the form of exempting existing subscribers of a service from a price
hike, or allowing them to keep consuming the service but no longer offering it to new cus-
tomers. These practices, while hardly widespread, have been a feature of telecom markets
for decades. More recently, in May of 2014, the popular media streaming service Netflix
offered a grandfather clause to all of its current customers shortly after announcing a gen-
eral price hike. Despite this, there is no literature on either firms' motivations for offering
grandfather clauses, or their effects on welfare. This is likely the case because it is difficult
to imagine a world in which grandfather clauses make economic sense.
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When a firm raises its price for new customers only, it must be responding to a spike in
demand. Otherwise, it would not expect to attract any new customers, especially not at a
higher price. Even assuming a demand spike, there must be some other force which drives
firms to offer a grandfather clause instead of raising the price for everyone. Firms could
do so as a tool for price discriminating between long term and short term customers, but
there are a number of reasons that this is unlikely. Typically when price discriminating,
a firm will want to charge a higher price for customers that value its products more. In
this case, that means that firms would expect its preexisting customers to be less likely
to enjoy their product than a newcomer. Alternatively, if there is an intrinsic value to the
firm of having longstanding customers, such as word-of-mouth, then using longstanding
contracts would be a more sensible approach. Even supposing that a price discrimination
makes sense, a grandfather clause would generically be non-optimal. This is because the
optimal discount would have to precisely balance out the increase in price generated by
the demand shock.
In order for grandfather clauses to be optimal, there must be some qualitative difference
between keeping a price and naming the same price two periods in a row. Consider two
competing firms that offer a subscription service, such as Netflix and Amazon Prime. Since
these two services are constantly adding new shows and services, as well as losing them,
people's idiosyncratic tastes are changing each period. However, because their customers
are engaged in hundreds if not thousands of markets, they do not typically search to dis-
cover their preferences each time they change. It is a rare Netflix subscriber that reconsid-
ers whether or not they want to change services every month. However, consumers can be
induced to search if something draws their attention to the market. There are two changes
that can grab consumers' attention: 1) the price of their service increases, or 2) the non-
idiosyncratic quality of the competition increases. In this way, when a firm develops an
average improvement to the quality of its service, it will induce its competitor's consumers
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to search. Ordinarily, a firm that has markedly improved its quality would also raise its
price. Here, however, they may wish to offer a grandfather clause in order to prevent their
consumers from searching and finding out that their idiosyncratic tastes have shifted far
enough such that they prefer the competition, despite the upswing in quality.
4.2 Model
4.2.1 A One Period Game
There are two firms that offer differentiated but competing subscription services. There is
a mass one of consumers that have idiosyncratic tastes over these services. That is, each
consumer values consuming product i at some average quality µi plus an iid preference
shock i with mean zero. Each consumer also suffers disutility equal to the price she paid,
or:
ui(pi) = µi + i − pi (4.1)
Then, a consumer will buy from firm 1 only if
µ1 + 1 − p1 ≥ µ2 + 2 − p2 (4.2)
Define  = 2 − 1 and let  ∼ F (x). To avoid having a positive measure of indifferent con-
sumers, let F (x) have no point masses. Then, the quantity of consumers that prefer firm 1
is equal to F (µ1 − µ2 + p2 − p1). Assuming that the µi are high enough to ensure market
coverage, only the difference, µ1 − µ2, has an impact on the model. Call this difference ∆.
Lastly, assume that firms produce their services at a constant marginal cost, which can be
safely normalized to zero. Then, firm profit functions are given by
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pi1(p1; p2,∆) = p1F (∆ + p2 − p1) (4.3)
pi2(p2; p1,∆) = p2(1− F (∆ + p2 − p1)) (4.4)
Then there will be an equilibrium whenever the first order conditions are satisfied. For a


































4.2.2 A Two Period Game
For the two period game, let a superscript denote a time period, either 1 or 2. For this
section, bear in mind that consumer search decisions are exogenous. Suppose that initially
both firms have the same average quality so that ∆1 = 0. In the first period of the game,
both firms enter the market and set their prices. Then, consumers search each firm and
choose their favorite and the game plays out in the same manner as the previous subsec-
tion. Each month, the firms lose contracts and add content and generally change their par-
ticular product. Consumers tastes, then, migrate with new 's being drawn. However, in
each of these periods, nothing draws consumers' attention to the market and they do not
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search. After the first period, there are customers that would benefit from switching ser-
vices, but aren't paying enough attention to realize this.
After a long period of time has passed, consumers original preferences and hence the ser-
vice that they subscribe to no longer carries any meaningful information about their cur-
rent tastes. That is, their second period 's are uncorrelated with the first period's. Sup-
pose that in this second period firm 1 announces a general improvement in the quality of
its product, either through higher definition streaming, producing its own shows, or a par-
ticularly large addition of new content. Let the value of this improvement to the average
customer be called ν. Then, in the second period, ∆2 = ν. For the purposes of this paper,
suppose that ν is exogenous and costless.
Because firm 1 has a very noticeable upswing in average quality and, presumably, adver-
tised this, some of the customers from firm 2 will search both firms and possibly switch
to firm 1. If firm 1 does not change its price, its consumers from the previous period will
see no reason to search. Thus, firm 1 could attempt to hold onto its current customer base
while attracting new customers by not increasing its price. Alternatively, it could name
a higher price to reflect its competitive edge, and count on its improved quality to keep
most, if not all, of its previous customers. Finally, it could try to get the best of both
worlds by maintaining its previous price for loyal customers so that they do not search,
while naming an optimal price for any newcomers. Obviously, the third option dominates
the first, but in some cases the second may be best.
If the firm raises its price globally, all consumers will search. Then the situation is the
same as in the previous one period case, but using ∆ = ν instead. If the firm offers a
grandfather clause, then its loyal customers are effectively out of the market and the firms
are competing only over the remaining mass 1
2
of consumers that search. Once again, this
competition will take the same form as in the single period model. Let superscripts de-
note the period and recall that ∆1 = 0. Let Π be the maximum profit a firm can achieve
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by naming a single price, and Πgfc be the similar maximum if the firm uses a grandfather






































When the increase in quality is large enough to completely drive a competing firm out of
the market ν ≥ 3a, then a firm has no motivation at all to offer a grandfather clause.
There's no need to prevent its consumers from searching, since they'll stay with the firm
anyway. When the increase in quality is tiny, firms have a large incentive to try to prevent
their consumers from searching, since they can expect to lose approximately half of the
ones that do. Then, firms will want to offer grandfather clauses when their average quality
improvements are relatively small. This result does not depend on the unrealistic assump-
tion that all of firm 2's customers search regardless of the size of firm 1's quality improve-
ment. If there were some scaling function, β(ν), that determined the proportion of firm
2's customers that searched in terms of the size of firm 1's improvement, it would have no
effect on firm 1's incentives to offer a grandfather clause or not, it would only reduce the
overall profitability of making the improvement in the first place.
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4.2.4 Welfare
In this model, grandfather clauses are unambiguously bad for total welfare. This can be
seen without any explicit calculations, and applies beyond the simple example that I have
worked through thus far. First, since firm and consumer welfare are both linear in transfer
payments, money is a zero sum affair which can be discounted in total welfare calculations.
Then, the only thing that matters is the matching values for consumers to firms. Grand-
father clauses act to distort these by preventing some of firm 1's customers from searching
and finding out that they would be better matched with firm 2. Furthermore, it is plain to
see that grandfather clauses are uniformly bad for firm 2 by effectively reducing the size of
its market. Grandfather clauses will be good for firm 1's welfare in the cases discussed in
the previous subsection.
The most interesting question is whether or not grandfather clauses are good for consumer
welfare. On the one hand, they reduce the average price paid by consumers. On the other
hand, they cause some consumers to be matched poorly and receive a service that they do
not enjoy very much. It bears asking then, is there a range of parameters in which firm 1
has an incentive to offer a grandfather clause that hurts consumers?
Returning to the simple, uniform example, the answer to this question can be calculated.
In a case without grandfather clauses, we know that the market will behave as outlined
in equations (4.5)-(4.10). Then, using equation (4.1), the total consumer welfare in such a




















where the first integral is for firm 1's consumers and the second is for firm 2's. This ex-
pression simplifies to
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Now, in the case with a grandfather clause, half of the market is content to remain with





(µ+ ν − a) + 1
2
W (4.18)
Clearly, W gfc > W if and only if µ + ν − a > W , which occurs when ν > 3a(3 − 2√2).
When ν is sufficiently small relative to a, the price savings (proportional to ν) are small
relative to the forgone gains through search (proportional to a). Recall that firm 1 will
only wish to offer a grandfather clause when ν < 3a(
√
2− 1). In this range, there are some
ν's where a grandfather clause is detrimental to consumer welfare, and others in which it
would enhance consumer welfare.
4.2.5 Investment
Hitherto, I have treated firm 1's improvement in overall quality, ν as exogenous. However,
it is more realistic to suppose that firm 1 is able to invest in some research and develop-
ment process in order to determine the magnitude of ν. Then, the natural question to in-
vestigae is whether a firm's ability to offer a grandfather clause would encourage or dis-
courage investment.
Suppose that there exists a convex, increasing, and differentiable function c(ν) that gives
the investment cost required to improve the average quality of the product by ν. Then,




. Let νGFC be the optimal level of improvement
when the firm institutes a grandfather clause, and let ν∗ be the optimal level of investment
when a firm does not offer a grandfather clause.
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1). In the case without grandfather clauses, equation (4.13) pro-
vides the profits as p21q
2






. Since q12 < 1 and c(ν) is convex, then ν
GFC < ν∗.
So far in this section, the firm's actual decision to offer a grandfather clause has been treated
exogenously for clarity of exposition. Recall that, generally speaking, there exists some
νˆ such that a firm will want to offer a grandfather clause if and only if ν < νˆ. Then, if
ν∗ ≥ νˆ, the option to offer a grandfather clause will have no effect on the equilibrium level
of investment. However, if ν∗ < νˆ then the firm will want to offer a grandfather clause and
will instead only invest to the level of νGFC . That is, depending on the functions c and F,
the ability to offer a grandfather clause will either reduce investment or have no effect.
4.3 Extensions
This paper is a very preliminary exploration of a hitherto unstudied phenomenon. A proper
treatment of this question would need to do away with the exogenous consumer search
behavior that I imposed in this model. If consumers' taste shocks were correlated period
to period and search were costly, this model could use the tools developed by the ratio-
nal inattention literature (Sims, 2003). Remember that consumers are perfectly informed
of prices and average quality, but remain uncertain about their own, specific tastes. Con-
sumers would optimally search infrequently, but would take into account changes to price
and non-idiosyncratic quality. Then the measure of consumers who search would be a
function that depended on the size of the change in average quality as well as the size of
the price differential between competitors. The basic forces of the model, which encourage
a dominant firm to offer a grandfather clause in order to discourage its consumers from
searching, would still have traction without the draconian assumptions imposed in this pa-
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per.
An alternative, and less ambitious, reform to this paper would be to assume that there
was some exogenous, but continuous and increasing, function α(p21 − p11) which deter-
mined the measure of consumers that searched as a function of the increase and prices.
It is likely that in such a model a grandfather clause would not generally be optimal. In-
stead, firm 1 would probably like to name a cheaper price for its loyal customers than new
customers, but still higher than the initial price. In this case, the behavior would less re-
semble a grandfather clause and more a rewards program, like those offered by airlines and
credit cards. The strength of this effect would depend on the exact shape of the function
α.
Last, by adding an element of research and development to the model and allowing both
firms to innovate, I could examine what effects the potential for grandfather clauses has
on a firms desire to innovate. They may make firms want to innovate more by yielding
a higher potential reward. However, given the rival's ability to do the same, it's possible
that grandfather clauses would lead to a prisoners' dilemma situation and actually reduce
firm profits from innovation.
4.4 Conclusions
In this paper, I have given a recent, high profile example of a firm instituting a grandfa-
ther clause. I have shown the theoretical difficulties in explaining this behavior using obvi-
ous, existing models. To rectify this gap in our understanding, I propose a model in which
grandfather clauses can be used to manipulate consumer search behavior to the benefit
of a firm o the detriment of its competitors. Using a simple example, I explore the conse-
quences of this behavior and find several interesting outcomes.
I find that even in an environment explicitly designed to promote them, grandfather clauses
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are not universally profitable. This may help explain why, while unquestionably present in
market behavior, grandfather clauses seem rare. I find that grandfather clauses are most
likely to be offered when the increase in quality that drives a spike in demand is modest. I
also find that, while grandfather clauses are unambiguously harmful to total welfare, they
have an ambiguous effect on consumer welfare. They help consumers when the increase
in quality is relatively large, although there exists a range of parameters in which a firm




[1] Arbatskaya, Maria, Morten Hviid, and Greg Shaffer. 2006. On the use of low-price
guarantees to discourage price cutting. International Journal of Industrial Organiza-
tion 24:1139-1156.
[2] Astorne-Figari, Carmen, and Aleksandr Yankelevich. 2014. Consumer search with
asymmetric price sampling. Economics Letters 122:331-333.
[3] Belton, Terrence M. 1987. A model of duopoly and meeting or beating competition.
International Journal of Industrial Organization 5:399-417.
[4] Biswas, Abhijit, Chris Pullig, Mehmet I. Yagci, and Dwane H. Dean. 2002. Consumer
evaluation of low price guarantees: The moderating role of reference price and store
image. Journal of Consumer Psychology 12:107-118.
[5] Caplin, Andrew, and Barry Nalebuff. 1991. "Aggregation and Imperfect Competition:
On the Existence of Equilibrium." Econometrica, 59(1): 25-59
[6] Chen, Yuxin, Chakravarthi Narasimhan, and Z. John Zhang. 2001. Consumer hetero-
geneity and competitive price-matching guarantees. Marketing Science 20:300-314.
[7] Corts, Kenneth S. 1996. On the competitive effects of price-matching policies. Inter-
national Journal of Industrial Organization 15:283-299.
72
[8] C. d'Aspremont, J. J. Gabszewicz, and J.-F. Thisse, On Hotelling's stability in com-
petition, Econometrica 47 (1979), 1145-1150.
[9] De los Santos, Babur. 2012. Consumer search on the internet. Working Paper, Kelley
School of Business, Indiana University.
[10] DelVecchio, Devon. 2005. Deal-prone consumers' response to promotion: The effects
of relative and absolute promotion value. Psychology & Marketing 22:373-391.
[11] Doyle, Christopher. 1988. Different selling strategies in Bertrand oligopoly. Economic
Letters 28:387-390.
[12] Dugar, Subhasish, and Todd Sorensen. 2006. Hassle costs, price-matching guarantees
and price competition: an experiment. Review of Industrial Organization 28:359-378.
[13] Hay, George A. 1982. Oligopoly, shared monopoly, and antitrust law. Cornell Law Re-
view 67:439-481.
[14] Hess, James D., and Eitan Gerstner. 1991. Price-matching policies: An empirical case.
Managerial and Decision Economics 12:305-315.
[15] Hotelling, H., 1929, Stability in Competition, The Economic Journal, 153(39), 41-57.
[16] Hviid, Morten, and Greg Shaffer. 1999. Hassle costs: The Achilles heel of price-
matching guarantees. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 8:489-522.
[17] Hviid, Morten, and Greg Shaffer. 2010. Matching own prices, rivals' prices or both?
The Journal of Industrial Economics 58:479-506.
[18] Irmen A. and J.-F. Thisse, 1998. Competition in multi-characteristics spaces:
Hotelling was almost right. Journal of Economic Theory 78, 76-102.
73
[19] Jain, Sanjay, and Joydeep Srivastava. 2000. An experimental and theoretical analysis
of price-matching refund policies. Journal of Marketing Research 37:351-362.
[20] Janssen, Maarten CW, Josè Luis Moraga-Gonzàlez, and Matthijs R. Wildenbeest.
2005. Truly costly sequential search and oligopolistic pricing. International Journal
of Industrial Organization 23:451-466.
[21] Janssen, Maarten CW, and Marielle C. Non. 2008. Advertising and consumer search
in a duopoly model. International Journal of Industrial Organization 26:354-371.
[22] Janssen, Maarten CW, and Alexei Parakhonyak. 2013. Price matching guarantees and
consumer search. International Journal of Industrial Organization 31:1-11.
[23] Janssen, Maarten CW, and Alexei Parakhonyak. 2014. Consumer search markets with
costly revisits. Economic Theory 55:481-514.
[24] Lancaster, K.J. (1966), A New Approach to Consumer Theory, Journal of Political
Economy, 74: 132-157.
[25] Lichtenstein, Donald R., Richard G. Netemeyer, and Scot Burton. 1990. Distinguish-
ing coupon proneness from value consciousness: An acquisition-transaction utility the-
ory perspective. The Journal of Marketing, 54:54-67.
[26] Mago, Shakun Datta, and Jennifer G. Pate. 2009. An experimental examination of
competitor-based price matching guarantees. Journal of Economic Behavior & Orga-
nization 70:342-360.
[27] Meurer, Michael, and Dale O. Stahl. 1994. Informative advertising and product
match. International Journal of Industrial Organization 12:1-19.
[28] Moorthy, Sridhar, and Ralph A. Winter. 2006. Price-matching guarantees. RAND
Journal of Economics 37:449-465.
74
[29] Moorthy, Sridhar, and Xubing Zhang. 2006. Price matching by vertically differenti-
ated retailers: Theory and evidence. Journal of Marketing Research 43:156-167.
[30] Moraga-Gonzàlez, Josè Luis, and Matthijs R. Wildenbeest. 2008. Maximum likelihood
estimation of search costs. European Economic Review 52:820-848.
[31] Narasimhan, Chakravarthi. 1988. Competitive promotional strategies. Journal of
Business 61:427-449.
[32] Png, Ivan PL, and David Hirshleifer. 1987. Price discrimination through offers to
match price. Journal of Business 60:365-383.
[33] Robert, Jacques, and Dale O. Stahl. 1993. Informative price advertising in a sequen-
tial search model. Econometrica 61:657-686.
[34] Salop, S.C. Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods. Bell Journal of Eco-
nomics, Vol. 10 (1979), pp. 141-156.
[35] Salop, Steven C. 1986. Practices that (credibly) facilitate oligopoly coordination. In
New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure edited by Joseph E. Stiglitz
and G. Frank Mathewson. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA., p. 265.
[36] Srivastava, Joydeep, and Nicholas Lurie. 2001. A consumer perspective on price-
matching refund policies: effect on price perceptions and search behavior. Journal of
Consumer Research 28:296-307.
[37] Stahl, Dale O. 1989. Oligopolistic pricing with sequential consumer search. American
Economic Review 79:700-712.
[38] Sims, C. A. (2003). Implications of rational inattention. Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 50(3), 665-690.
75
[39] Varian, Hal R. 1980. A model of sales. American Economic Review 70:651-659.
[40] Von Ungern-Sternberg, T., 1991, Monopolistic competition in the pyramid, The Jour-
nal of Industrial Economics, XXXIX (4), 355-368
[41] Weitzman, Martin L. 1979. Optimal search for the best alternative. Econometrica
47:641-654.
[42] Zhang, Z. John. 1995. Price-matching policy and the principle of minimum differentia-
tion. Journal of Industrial Economics 43:287-299.
76
Appendices
A Proofs for Chapter 1
We first define some useful notation. As with shoppers, for non-shoppers who have searched
both firms, we assume that θN ∈ [0, 1] will ignore price-matching guarantees and always
purchase from the firm with the lower listed price. The remaining 1 − θN will invoke a
price-matching guarantee at the last firm they stopped in when one is available and neces-
sary to obtain the lower price there and purchase from the firm with the lower listed price




be the proportion of shoppers (non-shoppers) who buy
from the first firm they searched after having observed the same price listed in both firms.1
Let γ be the proportion of non-shoppers who do not search after freely observing a price of
rj at firm i.
Definition 1. We say that firms have a mutual mass point when each firm has a mass
point at the same price. We say that firms have a mutual break when each firm's equilib-
rium support has a break over the same price interval.
Proof of Proposition 1
The proposition follows directly from the proof of Claims 1A and 1B below and from Weitz-
man's (1979) Pandora's Rule, which implies that non-shoppers' reservation prices asso-
ciated with each firm must be the same when consumers are indifferent regarding which
firm's price to sample first. In particular, Pandora's Rule rules out support types 3 and
4 in Claims 1A and 1B. The proofs of Claims 1A and 1B follows in the same vein as the
proofs of Propositions 2 through 5 in Narasimhan (1988). However, various complications
1The restriction αS(N) ≤ θS(N) is used for mathematical tractability. It says that when a firm under-
cuts a tie, it cannot lose customers.
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arise because consumers in our model follow an optimal search rule and firms have the
ability to price-match. Therefore, in order to aid the reader, we first outline the intuition
behind each of the five steps used to prove Claims 1A and 1B.
Step 1.1. v ≥ min {p¯1, p¯2} ≥ p1 = p2 = p ≥ 0.
Proof intuition. A firm, i, that prices below its rival's lowest price, p
j
, captures the same




), such that its profit is increasing in price over
this interval, a contradiction. Prices below zero result in negative profits. A firm i that
prices above v can only profit from consumers who accept an offer to match a price no
higher than v from firm j. Firm i cannot lose money from such consumers by shifting
mass above v down to v, but now expects to make sales if firm j prices above v.
Step 1.2. There are no mutual mass points.
Proof intuition. This claim follows via a standard mass point undercutting argument (in
this case, borrowed from a draft version of Janssen and Non 2008).
Step 1.3. The only possible breaks in the equilibrium supports are:
(i) If p¯i < p¯j, there is a break at (p¯i, p¯j).
(ii) If r = ri = rj < p¯i = p¯j, there may be a mutual break with lower bound r.
(iii) If ri 6= rj and firm i has a mass point at rj, there may be a mutual break with lower
bound rj.
Proof intuition. Because a firm's price distribution function is constant over a break, in
general, it's rival's profit will be higher at one end of the break than the other, or other-
wise be increasing in price along the break, which cannot be the case in a mixed strat-
egy equilibrium. The potential exceptions to this argument are items (i) to (iii) listed
above.
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Step 1.4. Firm i does not have a mass point in the lower bound or the interior of firm j's
equilibrium support, except possibly at rj.
Proof intuition. The proof of this step follows in a similar fashion to that of Step 1.2, but
relies on the convexity of firm supports away from rj such that continuous mass above a
rival mass point can be shifted below it for a gain in profit.
Step 1.5. If p¯ = p¯1 = p¯2 then either
(i) p¯ = min {v, r1, r2}, the supports have no breaks, and at most one firm can have a
mass point at p¯, or
(ii) p¯ = min {v, max {r1, r2}}, there is a mutual break above min {r1, r2} < p¯, firm i has
a mass point at rj, and firm j has a mass point at p¯.
Proof intuition. Using Steps 1.1 to 1.4, this step rules out item (ii) in Step 1.3 and places
restrictions on item (iii). Additionally, when firms have the same convex support, this
claim entails that p¯ = min{v, r1, r2}. At p¯, firm i only sells to those shoppers who invoke
price-matching guarantees to attain firm j's price. When p¯ < min{v, r1, r2}, firm i can
increase profit by raising prices paid by captive non-shoppers without decreasing shopper
profit. When p¯ > min{v, r1, r2}, firm i can do better by lowering p¯ to the point that it sells
to non-shoppers.
Step 1.5 allows us to narrow down the possible supports to item (i) in Step 1.3 and the
two items in Step 1.5. By supposing that all consumers are indifferent regarding which
firm to sample first, we can rely on Weitzman's (1979) Pandora's Rule to further narrow
the supports to item (i) in Step 1.5. Finally, if firm i prices with a mass point at rj in
equilibrium, but some non-shoppers searched upon observing rj, firm i would have an in-
centive to shift the mass point slightly below rj, a contradiction. We next proceed to the
complete proof.
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Claim 1A. Suppose that firms are exogenously required to offer price-matching guarantees
and that θS ∈ (0, 1]. In equilibrium, firms play mixed pricing strategies with p1 = p2 = p <
min{p¯1, p¯2}. The supports of the firm pricing distributions can only take one of the four
following forms:
1. Completely symmetric, no breaks: p¯1 = p¯2 = p¯ = min {v, r1 = r2}.
2. Single mass point, no breaks: firm i has a mass point at p¯1 = p¯2 = p¯ = min {v, rj},
rj ≤ ri.
3. Two mass points, mutual break: firm j has a mass point at ri < min {v, rj}; mutual
break over (ri, p
u) for pu ∈ (ri, p¯); p¯1 = p¯2 = p¯ = min {v, rj}, firm i has a mass
point at p¯.
4. Two mass points, single break: firm j has a mass point at p¯j = ri < min {v, rj}; firm
i has a break over (ri, p¯i) for p¯i = min {v, rj} and a mass point at p¯i.
The following steps complete the proof of Claim 1A.












, firm 1's expected profit is
p1 {µ [θS + (1− βS) (1− θS)]




< r2 by definition), which is increasing in p1, contradicting the equilibrium. If
p
1
≤ v < p
2






, firm 1's expected profit is given by Expression (19), which
is increasing in p1, so it must be the case that p1 = v. But if v = p1 < p2, then F1 (v) = 1
(because firm 1 does not make any profit at prices above v) and firm 2 expects profit of
µβS (1− θS) v everywhere on its support. For sufficiently small ε > 0, firm 2 benefits by
shifting its mass to v−ε for expected profit of (v − ε) {µ [θS + βS (1− θS)] + (1− µ) (1− βS)}.
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, then both firms make zero profits and either can increase profit by













Because prices below zero result in negative profit, p ≥ 0.2
Suppose v < min {p¯1, p¯2}. Then, for pi > v, firm i expects no profit with probability
Pr (pj > v) > 0 and because consumers never purchase at prices above v, firm i will only
profit from consumers who accept its price-match offer after they had rejected a price no
higher than v at firm j. Thus, firm i cannot lose money from such consumers by shift-
ing mass above v down to v. However, by doing so, it now also expects to earn a positive
profit with probability Pr (pj > v), a contradiction.
Step 1A.2. There are no mutual mass points.
Proof. Suppose that there is a mutual mass point at p. Firm 1's expected profit at p when
firm 2 charges p as well is
p {µ [βSαS + (1− βS) (1− αS)]
+ (1− µ) {βN [Ip<r2 + [γ + αN (1− γ)] Ip=r2 + αNIp>r2 ]
+ (1− βN) (1− αN) [(1− γ) Ip=r1 + Ip>r1 ]}}
(20)
where I is an indicator function. Suppose instead that firm 1 deviates to p− ε while firm 2
maintains its price at p. Firm 1's expected profit will be
(p− ε) {µ [βSθS + (1− βS)]
+ (1− µ) {βN [Ip−ε<r2 + [γ + θN (1− γ)] Ip−ε=r2 + θNIp−ε>r2 ]
+ (1− βN) [(1− γ) Ip=r1 + Ip>r1 ]}}
(21)
Expression (20) is smaller than Expression (21) provided that ε is sufficiently small.
Suppose firm 2 chooses a price other than p. Lowering the price charged never reduces the
number of sales so the loss to firm 1 from lowering the price by ε is at most ε. However,
when p is charged with positive probability, lowering the price by ε will with positive prob-
2If p = 0, then there must be zero density at p = 0 because at pi = ε < min {rj , v}, firm i will make
money off its non-shoppers.
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ability lead to a gain and with the complementary probability at worst lead to a loss of ε.
Therefore, by shifting its mass point at p to p−ε for sufficiently small ε firm 1 increases its
expected profit, a contradiction. For the case αS = θS, αN = θN , and βN = βS = 1, firm 1
cannot profitably undercut the mutual mass point, but firm 2 can.
Step 1A.3. The only possible breaks in the equilibrium supports are:
(i) If p¯i < p¯j, there is a break at (p¯i, p¯j) ∈ Sj.
(ii) If r = ri = rj < p¯i = p¯j, there may be a mutual break with lower bound r.
(iii) If ri 6= rj and firm i has a mass point at rj, there may be a mutual break with lower
bound rj.




) ∈ int(S1 ∩ S2).
Suppose first, without loss of generality, that in equilibrium, firm 2 has no support over H,
but that firm 1 does. Firm 1's expected profit at some p1 ∈ H is
µ {p1 (θSβS + 1− βS) [1− F2 (p1)] + (1− θS) (1− βS) E [p2|p2 < p1]F2 (p1)}
+ (1− µ) {p1βN {Ip1<r2 + {γ + θN (1− γ) [1− F2 (p1)]} Ip1=r2
+ θN [1− F2 (p1)] Ip1>r2}
+ (1− βN) {p1 [1− F2 (r1) + (1− γ) Pr (p2 = r1)] Ip1<r1 + p1 [1− F2 (r1)] Ip1=r1
+ {p1 [1− F2 (p1)] + r1 (1− θN) (1− γ) Pr (p2 = r1)
+ (1− θN) E [p2|r1 < p2 < p1] [F2 (p1)− F2 (r1)]} Ip1>r1}}
(22)
As firm 1 raises p1 along H, its expected profit is increasing because F2 (p1) is constant
along H (and equal to F2 (r1) if r1 ∈ H). Thus, if r2 /∈ H, firm 1 could increase expected
profits by shifting all its mass in H slightly below pu (to pu if firm 2 does not have a mass





slightly below r2, and all mass in (r2, p
u) either slightly below r2 or
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to pu, again contradicting the equilibrium. A similar argument applies when firm 1 has no
support over H, but firm 2 does. This tells us that any breaks in S1 ∩ S2 are mutual.
Now suppose that neither firm randomizes over H in equilibrium. Suppose first that pd 6=
r1, p
d 6= r2 and that neither firm has a mass point at pd. Then either firm 1 has a strictly
higher expected profit at pu (or slightly below r2 if r2 ∈ H) than at pd, or firm 2 has a
strictly higher expected profit at pu (or slightly below r1 if r1 ∈ H) than at pd, or possibly
both, if neither firm has a mass point at pu, contradicting the equilibrium.
Suppose that firm i has a mass point at pd 6= rj. Because there are no mutual mass points,
firm i could increase profits by shifting its mass point to pu (or slightly below pu if firm j
has a mass point there, or slightly below rj if rj ∈ H).
If pd = rj 6= ri and firm i has no mass point at pd, firm j's expected profit will be strictly
higher at pu (or slightly below pu if firm i has a mass point there, or slightly below ri if
ri ∈ H) than at pd. But if firm i does have a mass point at pd, then it is possible that
profits are the same at pd and pu for each firm. If γ 6= 1, firm i can profitably deviate by
shifting its mass point slightly below pd. In doing so, it retains 1 − γ non-shoppers who
search after observing a price of rj and have a positive probability of purchasing from firm
j. However, if γ = 1, neither firm may have a profitable deviation. This may also be the
case if, pd = r1 = r2.
From Step 1A.1, we know that both S1 and S2 have the same lower bound, p, so S1∆S2 ∈
(min {p¯1, p¯2} , max {p¯1, p¯2}]. Suppose, without loss of generality, that p¯1 > p¯2. At p1 ∈
(p¯2, p¯1], firm 1's expected profit is
µ (1−θS) (1−βS) E [p2] + (1−µ) {p1βN (Ip1<r2 + γIp1=r2) Ip1≤v
+ (1−θN) (1−βN) {E [p2|r1 < p2] [1− F2 (r1)] + r1 (1−γ) Pr (p2 = r1)}}
(23)
If p¯2 < r2, then for βN 6= 0, firm 1's expected profit is increasing in p1 along (p¯2, min {v, r2})
and is strictly greater anywhere in (p¯2, min {v, r2}) than at any price above min {v, r2}.
As a result, for ε > 0 sufficiently small, firm 1 can increase profit by shifting mass in
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(p¯2, p¯1] to min {v, r2} − ε (likewise if p¯2 = min {v, r2}). Therefore, when p¯2 ≤ r2, ei-
ther S1∆S2= {p¯1}= {min {v, r2}}, or S1∆S2 = ∅. Suppose S1∆S2 = {p¯1}. If firm 2 has
no mass point at p¯2, this means that firm 1's expected profit at p¯1 is strictly higher than
its expected profit at p¯2, a contradiction. If firm 2 has a mass point at p¯2 6= r1, Because
there are no mutual mass points, firm 2 can profitably shift the mass point to slightly be-
low p¯1 (or slightly below r1 if r1 ∈ (p¯2, p¯1]). However, if γ = 1, firm 2 has a mass point
at p¯2 = r1, and F1 (r1) is large enough, then neither firm may have a profitable deviation.
Following the proof of Step 1A.5, we will discuss why an equilibrium where r2 < p¯2 < p¯1
cannot exist. A similar argument applies when p¯2 > p¯1.
Corollary 1A.1. The equilibrium supports are the same except if p¯i = rj < p¯j = min {v, ri}.
Step 1A.4. Firm i does not have a mass point in the lower bound or the interior of firm
j's equilibrium support, except possibly at rj.
Proof. Suppose, without loss of generality, that firm 2 has a mass point at p ∈ S1\ {p¯1},
and suppose that p 6= r1. Firm 1's expected profit at p − ε when firm 2 charges p is given
by Expression (21), whereas its expected profit at p+ ε is
µp (1− θS) (1− βS) + (1− µ) {(p+ ε) βN (Ip+ε<r2 + γIp+ε=r2)
+p (1− θN) (1− βN) [(1− γ) Ip=r1 + Ip>r1 ]}
(24)
Expression (24) is smaller than Expression (21) provided that ε is sufficiently small. Sup-
pose firm 2 chooses a price other than p. Lowering the price charged never reduces the
number of sales so the loss to firm 1 from lowering the price by 2ε or less is at most 2ε.
However, when p is charged with positive probability, lowering the price by 2ε or less will
with positive probability lead to a gain and with the complementary probability at worst
lead to a loss of 2ε. Therefore, by shifting its mass between p and p + ε to p − ε for suf-
ficiently small ε, firm 1 increases its expected profit, a contradiction. By a similar argu-
ment, firm 1 cannot have a mass point at p ∈ S2\ {p¯2}, except possibly if p = r2.
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Step 1A.5. If p¯ = p¯1 = p¯2 then either
(i) p¯ = min {v, r1, r2}, the supports have no breaks, and at most one firm can have a
mass point at p¯, or
(ii) p¯ = min {v, max {r1, r2}}, there is a mutual break above min {r1, r2} < p¯, firm i has
a mass point at rj, and firm j has a mass point at p¯.
Proof. Suppose that p¯ = p¯1 = p¯2 and neither firm has a mass point at p¯. From Steps
1A.1 and 1A.4 we know that p < p¯ ≤ v. Suppose, without loss of generality, that p¯ <
min {v, r2}. At p¯, firm 1's expected profit is given by Expression (23) (with p1 = p¯),
which is increasing in p1 along (p¯, min {v, r2}) when βN 6= 0, a contradiction. Suppose
instead that p¯ > min {v, r2} = r2. For any p1 ∈ (r2, p¯), in equilibrium, E pi1 (p¯) =
E pi1 (p1, F2 (p1)). E pi1 (p¯) is given by Expression (23) (with p1 = p¯). If r2 ≥ r1, for
p1 ∈ (r2, p¯), E pi1 (p1, F2 (p1)) equals
µ {p1 (θSβS + 1− βS) [1− F2 (p1)] + (1− θS) (1− βS) E [p2|p2 < p1]F2 (p1)}
+ (1− µ) {p1βNθN [1− F2 (p1)] + (1− βN) {r1 (1− θN) (1− γ) Pr (p2 = r1)
+ p1 [1− F2 (p1)] + (1− θN) E [p2|r1 < p2 < p1] [F2 (p1)− F2 (r1)]}}
(25)
Setting Expression (23) equal to Expression (25) and differentiating with respect to p1
yields
[µ (θSβS + 1− βS) + (1− µ) (θNβN + 1− βN)] [1− F2 (p1)]
− [µθS + (1− µ) θN ] p1F2′ (p1) = 0
(26)
Solving the differential equation given by Equation (26) using the initial value F2 (p¯) = 1
gives us F2 (p1) = 1 for all p1 ∈ (r2, p¯], a contradiction. Similarly, if r1 ∈ (r2, p¯), then
Expression (25) represents firm 1's expected profit at (r1, p¯) and F2 (p1) = 1 for all p1 ∈
(r1, p¯], a contradiction. If on the other hand, r1 ≥ p¯, E pi1 (p¯) becomes µ (1− θS) (1− βS) E [p2]
while E pi1 (p1, F2 (p1)) at p1 ∈ (r2, p¯) becomes
µ {p1 (θSβS + 1− βS) [1− F2 (p1)] + (1− θS) (1− βS) E [p2|p2 < p1]F2 (p1)}
+ (1− µ) βNθNp1 [1− F2 (p1)]
(27)
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Setting µ (1− θS) (1− βS) E [p2] equal to Expression (27) and solving the resulting differ-
ential equation using the initial value F2 (p¯) = 1 again gives us F2 (p1) = 1 for all p1 ∈
(r2, p¯], a contradiction. Hence, for βN 6= 0, p¯ = min {v, r2}. By a similar argument, for
βN 6= 1, p¯ = min {v, r1}, so when neither firm has a mass point at p¯, p¯ = min {v, r1, r2}.
From Step 1A.2, we know that at most one firm can have a mass point at p¯, say firm j. If
γ = 1 or v < ri, then following the argument in the paragraph above, p¯ = min {v, ri}.
Otherwise, firm j cannot have a mass point at p¯ (using reasoning similar to that in the
proof of Step 1A.3). Moreover, if rj ≥ ri, then p¯ = min {v, r1, r2} and from Step 1A.3, we
know that the firm supports have no breaks. Conversely, suppose rj < ri (and therefore,
rj < v). Without loss of generality, let i = 1. From Step 1A.4, we know that firm 2 cannot
have a mass point at r2. At r2, firm 1 expects profit of
µ {r2 (θSβS + 1− βS) [1− F2 (r2)] +
(1− θS) (1− βS) E [p2|p2 < r2]F2 (r2)}+ (1− µ) βNr2
(28)
whereas at p1 ∈ (r2, p¯), E pi1 (p1, F2 (p1)) is given by Expression (27). By definition, for
p1 ∈ (r2, p¯), 0 < F2 (r2) ≤ F2 (p1), so for p1 close enough to r2, Expression (28) is strictly
greater than Expression (27). Therefore, r2 must be the lower bound for a break in S1 and
we are in Case (iii) of Step 1A.3).
Notice that Step 1A.5 rules out Case (ii) in Step 1A.3. Moreover, following the same pro-
cedure used in Step 1A.5, it is easy to show that an equilibrium where rj < p¯j < p¯i cannot
exist. In particular, by setting E pii (p¯i) = Epii (pi, Fj (pi)) for pi ∈ (rj, p¯j] and solving for
Fj, we see that Fj (pi) = 1 for all pi ∈ (rj, p¯j], a contradiction.
Claim 1A: Support Type 4. Without loss of generality, suppose that βN is such that
p¯1 = r2 < min {v, r1}= p¯2. Then a complete solution to an equilibrium with support type






= Epi1 (p1, F2 (p1)) ⇔ p [µ (βSθS + 1− βS) + (1− µ) βN ]
= µ {p1 (βSθS + 1− βS) [1− F2 (p1)]






= Epi1 (r2, F2 (r2)) ⇔ p [µ (βSθS + 1− βS) + (1− µ) βN ]
= µ {r2 (βSθS + 1− βS) Pr (p2 = p¯2)






= Epi2 (p2, F1 (p2))
⇔ p {µ [(1− βS) θS + βS] + (1− µ) (1− βN)} = (1− µ) (1− βN) p2




= Epi2 (p¯2) ⇔ p {µ [(1− βS) θS + βS] + (1− µ) (1− βN)}




F1(p)dp+ r1 − r2 = c (33)
∫ r2
p
F2(p)dp = c (34)
Pr (p1 = r2) = 1− lim
ε→0−
F1 (r2 − ε) ∈ (0, 1) (35)
In addition to Equations (29) to (35), firm 2 must have an expected price which is strictly
lower than that of firm 1. Moreover, the inequality, E pi1 (r2, F2 (r2)) > E pi1 (p¯2 − ε, F2 (p¯2 − ε))
must hold for all ε ∈ (0, p¯2 − r2). That is, firm 1 must not wish to deviate above r2.
We can use the following procedure to look for equilibrium. First, we use Equation (29)
and (31) to solve for F2 and F1 respectively, in terms of p. Plugging F2 into Equation (34)
and using Equation (30) to solve for p we obtain r2 in terms of Pr (p2 = p¯2). Plugging F1
into Equation (35) yields Pr (p1 = r2) in terms of Pr (p2 = p¯2). Rewriting F1 in terms of
Pr (p2 = p¯2) and plugging into Equation (33) yields r1 in terms of Pr (p2 = p¯2). Finally,
using Equation (32) to solve for p and setting this equal to the solution obtained from
Equation (30) we can rewrite r1 as an alternate function of Pr (p2 = p¯2). Setting the two
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expressions for r1 equal to each other, we can now solve for Pr (p2 = p¯2) in terms of the ex-
ogenous parameters. An equilibrium exists only if there is a solution to Pr (p2 = p¯2) in the
interval [0, 1] such that non-shoppers strictly prefer to search firm 2 first and firm 1 does
not wish to deviate above r2.
Claim 1B. Suppose that firm 1 is exogenously required to offer price-matching guarantees





= p < min{p¯1, p¯2}. The supports of the firm pricing distributions can only take one of
the four following forms:
1. Completely symmetric, no breaks: p¯1 = p¯2 = p¯ = min {v, r1 = r2}.
2. Single mass point, no breaks: firm i has a mass point at p¯1 = p¯2 = p¯ = min {v, rj},
rj ≤ ri.
3. Two mass points, mutual break: firm j has a mass point at ri < min {v, rj}; mutual
break over (ri, p
u) for pu ∈ (ri, p¯); p¯1 = p¯2 = p¯ = min {v, rj}, firm i has a mass
point at p¯.
4. Two mass points, single break: firm j has a mass point at p¯j = ri < min {v, rj}; firm
i has a break over (ri, p¯i) for p¯i = min {v, rj} and a mass point at p¯i.
The following steps complete the proof of Claim 1B.












, firm 1's expected profit is
p1 {µ+ (1− µ) {βN + (1− βN) {[1− F2 (r1)] + (1− γ) Pr (p2 = r1)}}} (36)







firm 1's expected profit is given by Expression (36), which is increasing in p1, so it must be
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the case that p
1




, firm 2 makes no profit on its support and for





















, firm 2's expected profit is
p2 {µ [θS + βS (1− θS)]




< r1 by definition) which is increasing in p2, again contradicting the equilib-
rium. If p
2
≤ v < p
1






, firm 2's expected profit is given by Expression (37),
which is increasing in p2, so it must be the case that p2 = v. But if v = p2 < p1, then
F1 (v) = 1 (because firm 2 does not make any profit at prices above v) and firm 1 expects
profit of µ (1− βS) (1− θS) v everywhere on its support. For sufficiently small ε > 0, firm 1
benefits by shifting its mass to v−ε for expected profit of (v − ε) {µ [θS + (1− βS) (1− θS)] + (1− µ) βS}.




= p. Because prices below zero result in negative profit, p ≥ 0.3
The proof that v ≥ min {p¯1, p¯2} follows precisely that in Step 1A.1.
Step 1B.2. There are no mutual mass points.
Proof. Suppose that there is a mutual mass point at p. Firm 1's expected profit at p when
firm 2 charges p as well is given by Expression (20). Suppose instead that firm 1 deviates
to p− ε while firm 2 maintains its price at p. Firm 1's expected profit will be
(p− ε) {µ+ (1− µ) {βN + (1− βN) [(1− γ) Ip=r1 + Ip>r1 ]}} (38)
Expression (20) is smaller than Expression (38) provided that ε is sufficiently small.
Suppose firm 2 chooses a price other than p. Lowering the price charged never reduces the
number of sales so the loss to firm 1 from lowering the price by ε is at most ε. However,
when p is charged with positive probability, lowering the price by ε will with positive prob-
3If p = 0, then there must be zero density at p = 0 because at pi = ε < min {rj , v}, firm i will make
money off its non-shoppers.
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ability lead to a gain and with the complementary probability at worst lead to a loss of ε.
Therefore, by shifting its mass point at p to p−ε for sufficiently small ε firm 1 increases its
expected profit, a contradiction.
Step 1B.3. The only possible breaks in the equilibrium supports are:
(i) If p¯i < p¯j, there is a break at (p¯i, p¯j) ∈ Sj.
(ii) If r = ri = rj < p¯i = p¯j, there may be a mutual break with lower bound r.
(iii) If ri 6= rj and firm i has a mass point at rj, there may be a mutual break with lower
bound rj.




) ∈ int(S1 ∩ S2).
Suppose first that in equilibrium, firm 2 has no support over H, but that firm 1 does.
Firm 1's expected profit at some p1 ∈ H is
µ {p1 [1− F2 (p1)] + (1− θS) (1− βS) E [p2|p2 < p1]F2 (p1)}
+ (1− µ) {p1βN {Ip1<r2 + {γ + (1− γ) [1− F2 (p1)]} Ip1=r2 + [1− F2 (p1)] Ip1>r2}
+ (1− βN) {p1 [1− F2 (r1) + (1− γ) Pr (p2 = r1)] Ip1<r1 + p1 [1− F2 (r1)] Ip1=r1
+ {p1 [1− F2 (p1)] + r1 (1− θN) (1− γ) Pr (p2 = r1)
+ (1− θN) E [p2|r1 < p2 < p1] [F2 (p1)− F2 (r1)]} Ip1>r1}}
(39)
As firm 1 raises p1 along H, its expected profit is increasing because F2 (p1) is constant
along H (and equal to F2 (r1) if r1 ∈ H). Thus, if r2 /∈ H, firm 1 could increase expected
profits by shifting all its mass in H slightly below pu (to pu if firm 2 does not have a mass










either slightly below r2 or to
pu, again contradicting the equilibrium.
Conversely, suppose that firm 1 has no support over H, but that firm 2 does. Firm 2's ex-
pected profit at some p2 ∈ H is
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µp2 [(1− βS) θS + βS] [1− F1 (p2)] + (1− µ) p2
×{(1− βN) {Ip2<r1 + {γ + θN (1− γ) [1− F1 (p2)]} Ip2=r1
+ θN [1− F1 (p2)] Ip2>r1}
+ βN {[1− F1 (r2) + (1− γ) Pr (p1 = r2)] Ip2<r2
+ [1− F1 (r2)] Ip2=r2 + [1− F1 (p2)] Ip2>r2}}
(40)
As firm 2 raises p2 along H, its expected profit is increasing because F1 (p2) is constant
along H (and equal to F1 (r2) if r2 ∈ H). Thus, if r1 /∈ H, firm 2 could increase expected
profits by shifting all its mass in H slightly below pu (to pu if firm 2 does not have a mass





slightly below r1, and all mass in (r1, p
u) either slightly below r1 or to p
u,
again contradicting the equilibrium. Thus, any breaks in S1 ∩ S2 are mutual.
The remainder of this proof follows similarly to that in Step 1A.3.
Corollary 1B.1. The equilibrium supports are the same except if p¯i = rj < p¯j = min {v, ri}.
Step 1B.4. Firm i does not have a mass point in the lower bound or the interior of firm
j's equilibrium support, except possibly at rj.
Proof. The proof to show that firm 2 does not have a mass point at p ∈ S1\ {p¯1} pro-
ceeds precisely as that in Step 1A.4. Suppose instead that firm 1 has a mass point at p ∈
S2\ {p¯2} and that p 6= r2. Firm 2's expected profit at p− ε when firm 1 charges p is
(p− ε) {µ [(1− βS) θS + βS] + (1− µ)
×{(1− βN) [Ip−ε<r1 + [γ + θN (1− γ)] Ip−ε=r1 + θNIp−ε>r1 ]
+ βN [(1− γ) Ip=r2 + Ip>r2 ]}}
(41)
whereas its expected profit at p+ ε is
(1− µ) (p+ ε) (1− βN) (Ip+ε<r1 + γIp+ε=r1) (42)
Expression (42) is smaller than Expression (41) provided that ε is sufficiently small. Sup-
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pose firm 1 chooses a price other than p. Lowering the price charged never reduces the
number of sales so the loss to firm 2 from lowering the price by 2ε or less is at most 2ε.
However, when p is charged with positive probability, lowering the price by 2ε or less will
with positive probability lead to a gain and with the complementary probability at worst
lead to a loss of 2ε. Therefore, by shifting its mass between p and p + ε to p − ε for suffi-
ciently small ε, firm 2 increases its expected profit, a contradiction.
Step 1B.5. If p¯ = p¯1 = p¯2 then either
(i) p¯ = min {v, r1, r2}, the supports have no breaks, and at most one firm can have a
mass point at p¯, or
(ii) p¯ = min {v, max {r1, r2}}, there is a mutual break above min {r1, r2} < p¯, firm i has
a mass point at rj, and firm j has a mass point at p¯.
Proof. Suppose that p¯ = p¯1 = p¯2 and neither firm has a mass point at p¯. From Steps 1B.1
and 1B.4 we know that p < p¯ ≤ v. Suppose that p¯ < min {v, r2}. At p1 ∈ [p¯, min {v, r2}),
firm 1's expected profit is
µ (1− θS) (1− βS) E [p2]
+ (1− µ) {βNp1 + (1− θN) (1− βN) {E [p2|r1 < p2] [1− F2 (r1)]
+ r1 (1− γ) Pr (p2 = r1)}}
(43)
which is increasing in p1 when βN 6= 0, a contradiction. Suppose instead that p¯ > min {v, r2}=
r2. For any p1 ∈ (r2, p¯), in equilibrium, E pi1 (p¯)= Epi1 (p1, F2 (p1)). E pi1 (p¯) equals
µ (1− θS) (1− βS) E [p2]
+ (1− µ) (1− θN) (1− βN) {E [p2|r1 < p2] [1− F2 (r1)]
+ r1 (1− γ) Pr (p2 = r1)}
(44)
If r2 ≥ r1, for p1 ∈ (r2, p¯), E pi1 (p1, F2 (p1)) equals
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µ {p1 [1− F2 (p1)] + (1− θS) (1− βS) E [p2|p2 < p1]F2 (p1)}
+ (1− µ) {p1βN [1− F2 (p1)] + (1− βN) {r1 (1− θN) (1− γ) Pr (p2 = r1)
+ p1 [1− F2 (p1)] + (1− θN) E [p2|r1 < p2 < p1] [F2 (p1)− F2 (r1)]}}
(45)
Setting Expression (44) equal to Expression (45) and differentiating with respect to p1
yields
1− F2 (p1)− [µ (θS + βS − θSβS) + (1− µ) (θN + βN − θNβN)] p1F2′ (p1) = 0 (46)
Solving the differential equation given by Equation (46) using the initial value F2 (p¯) = 1
gives us F2 (p1) = 1 for all p1 ∈ (r2, p¯], a contradiction. Similarly, if r1 ∈ (r2, p¯), then
Expression (45) represents firm 1's expected profit at (r1, p¯) and F2 (p1) = 1 for all p1 ∈
(r1, p¯], a contradiction. If on the other hand, r1 ≥ p¯, E pi1 (p¯) becomes µ (1− θS) (1− βS) E [p2]
while E pi1 (p1, F2 (p1)) at p1 ∈ (r2, p¯) becomes
µ {p1 [1− F2 (p1)] + (1− θS) (1− βS) E [p2|p2 < p1]F2 (p1)}
+ (1− µ) βNp1 [1− F2 (p1)]
(47)
Setting µ (1− θS) (1− βS) E [p2] equal to Expression (47) and solving the resulting dif-
ferential equation using the initial value F2 (p¯) = 1 again gives us F2 (p1) = 1 for all
p1 ∈ (r2, p¯], a contradiction. Hence, for βN 6= 0, p¯ = min {v, r2}. Now suppose that p¯ <
min {v, r1}. At p2 ∈[p¯, min {v, r1}), firm 2's expected profit is (1− µ) (1− βN) p2, which
is increasing in p2 when βN 6= 1, a contradiction. Suppose instead, that p¯ > min {v, r1}.
But then, at p¯, firm 2 expects no profit, a contradiction. Thus, p¯ = min {v, r1}, so when
neither firm has a mass point at p¯, p¯ = min {v, r1, r2}.
From Step 1B.2, we know that at most one firm can have a mass point at p¯, say firm j. If
γ = 1 or v < ri, then following the argument in the paragraph above, p¯ = min {v, ri}.
Otherwise, firm j cannot have a mass point at p¯ (using reasoning similar to that in the
proof of Step 1B.3). Moreover, if rj ≥ ri, then p¯ = min {v, r1, r2} and from Step 1B.3, we
know that the firm supports have no breaks. Conversely, suppose rj < ri (and therefore,
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rj < v). First, let i = 1. From Step 1B.4, we know that firm 2 cannot have a mass point at
r2. At r2, firm 1 expects profit of
µ {r2 [1− F2 (r2)] + (1− θS) (1− βS) E [p2|p2 < r2]F2 (r2)}+ (1− µ) βNr2 (48)
whereas at p1 ∈ (r2, p¯), E pi1 (p1, F2 (p1)) is given by Expression (47). By definition, for
p1 ∈ (r2, p¯), 0 < F2 (r2) ≤ F2 (p1), so for p1 close enough to r2, Expression (48) is strictly
greater than Expression (47). Therefore, r2 must be the lower bound for a break in S1 and
we are in Case (iii) of Step 1B.3. Now let j = 1. From Step 1B.4, we know that firm 1
cannot have a mass point at r1. At r1, firm 2 expects profit of
r1 {µ [(1− βS) θS + βS] [1− F1 (r1)] + (1− µ) (1− βN)} (49)
whereas at p2 ∈ (r1, p¯), E pi2 (p2, F1 (p2)) is given by
p2 {µ [(1− βS) θS + βS] + (1− µ) (1− βN) θN} [1− F1 (p2)] (50)
By definition, for p2 ∈ (r1, p¯), 0 < F1 (r1) ≤ F1 (p2), so for p2 close enough to r1, Expres-
sion (49) is strictly greater than Expression (50). Therefore, r1 must be the lower bound
for a break in S2 and we are again in Case (iii) of Step 1B.3.
Notice that Step 1B.5 rules out Case (ii) in Step 1B.3.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. In equilibrium, a firm must be indifferent between any price in its support. There-




= E pii (pi, Fj (pi)). Then for firm 1, the profit
equality condition is given by
µ {p1 (βSθS + 1− βS) [1− F2 (p1)] + (1− θS) (1− βS) E [p2|p2 < p1]F2 (p1)}
+ (1− µ) βNp1 = p [µ (βSθS + 1− βS) + (1− µ) βN ]
(51)
Differentiating Equation (51) with respect to p1 and rearranging gives
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µ {(βSθS + 1− βS)F2 (p1) + θSp1F2′ (p1)− βSθS − 1 + βS} − (1− µ) βN = 0 (52)
























(1− µ) (1− βN)






Without loss of generality, suppose that firm 1 is the one with the mass point at p¯. Setting

















1− (1− µ) βN







When r2 ≤ v, p¯ = r2. Optimal search requires that Equation (2.1) holds. Substituting
Equation (56) into Equation (2.1) yields[
1 +
(1− µ) βN






1− (1− µ) βN









Integrating to solve for r2 in terms of µ, θS, c, βS and βN , we get
r2 (µ, θS, c, βS, βN) = c
{
1− [(1− µ) βN ]
θS
βSθS+1−βS
µ (1− βS) (1− θS)
×
{
[µ (βSθS + 1− βS) + (1− µ) βN ]
(1−βS)(1−θS)




By assumption, non-shoppers are indifferent between which firm to sample first. Weitz-
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The first equation follows from Pandora's Rule and non-shoppers' indifference (so r2 =
r1 = r); the second, which sets the expected price of the two firms equal to each other,
follows from integration by parts together with the fact that p¯ =min {v, r} in equilib-
rium. By setting the expected price of firm 1 equal to that of firm 2, we can solve for βN
in terms of βS and the other parameters. To obtain an expression for the expected price of
each firm we proceed as in Janssen, Moraga-Gonzàlez, and Wildenbeest (2005). For firm 2,












p from Equation (60) gives









Integrating and rearranging yields
E2 [p] =
p¯[(1− µ) βN ]
θS
βSθS+1−βS
µ (1− βS) (1− θS)
×
{
[µ (βSθS + 1− βS) + (1− µ) βN ]
(1−βS)(1−θS)




Proceeding similarly for firm 1, we get
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(1− µ) (1− βN)










We can now implicitly solve for βN as a function of the remaining parameters using E1 [p] =
E2 [p].
Define r∗1 and r
∗
2 as the equilibrium reservation prices. If r2 (µ, θS, c, βS, βN) ≤ v, r∗2 is
defined by Equation (58). Because firms are not concerned with prices above v, if r2 (µ, θS, c, βS, βN) >





Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. We proceed to prove Part (2) of the proposition first:
2. Plugging βS = βN = 1/2 into Equation (61) gives









where r∗ = p¯ by assumption. To see that r∗ is increasing in c, observe that the inte-
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grand in Equation (65) is less than 1 for all values of of u ∈ [0, 1), µ ∈ (0, 1), and
θS ∈ (0, 1]. Because the limits of integration are 0 and 1, this implies that E [p] < r∗
and r∗ > 0. Thus, the derivative of r∗ with respect to c is clearly positive as well.
The derivatives of the right hand side integrand in Equation (65) with respect to µ
and θS are both negative, implying that E[p]/r
∗ is decreasing in µ and θS and ac-
cording to Equation (2.1) (rewritten as r∗ − E[p] = c using p¯ = min {v, r∗}), so is
r∗.
1. Define F (µ, θS, c; p) as the equilibrium distribution function when p¯ = r
∗ < v and
F (µ, θS, v; p) as the equilibrium distribution function when p¯ = v < r
∗. From Equa-
tion (56) and Part (2), we have






























































































The inequalities in Equations (67) and (69) are strict for all p ∈ [0, v).
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Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. We begin by showing that p ≥ min {v, r1, r2}. Suppose conversely that p < min {v, r1, r2}.
At any p1 ∈
(
p, min {v, r1, r2}
)
, firm 1 captures 1−βS shoppers, who pay min {p1, p2}, and
βN , βN+ (1− γ) (1− βN), or all non-shoppers, depending on whether firm 2 prices below,
at, or above r1, where γ is the proportion of non-shoppers who do not search after freely
observing a price of r1 at firm 2. Non-shoppers who buy from firm 1 end up paying p1.
Thus, firm 1's profit is increasing in p1, a contradiction.
It is straightforward to show that v ≥ min {p¯1, p¯2} ≥ p≥ min {v, r1, r2}.4 Moreover, from
Equation (2.1) we know that min {r1, r2} > p, so min {p¯1, p¯2}= v = p. Suppose, without
loss of generality, that p¯2 > p¯1. At any p2 ∈ (p¯1, p¯2], firm 2 expects profit of µβSv. By
shifting its mass in (p¯1, p¯2] to v, firm 2 expects an additional profit of (1− µ) (1− βN) v, a
contradiction. Using a similar argument we can rule out p¯1 > p¯2. Thus, v= p¯1 = p¯2 = p¯ =
p. Because the unique equilibrium is symmetric and employs pure strategies, we can define
F1 (p) = F2 (p) = F (p) as 0 for p < v and as 1 for p ≥ v. But then, using Equation (2.1)
we get r∗1 = r
∗
2 = v + c.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. This proof follows very similarly to that of Proposition 2. In equilibrium, a firm
must be indifferent between any price in its support. Therefore, for any pi in the support




= Epii (pi, Fj (pi)). Differentiating this profit equality with respect to pi for
i = 1, 2, rearranging, and solving the ensuing differential equation gives us F1 and F2 in
the statement of the proposition.
A comparison of F1 and F2 will reveal that when βN < 1/2, it must be that lim
x→p¯−
F2 (x) <
0, such that firm 2 is the one with the mass point at p¯. As discussed in the body of the
4See Claim 1A, Step 1A.1, which holds for all θS .
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article, when βS = 1/2, consumer indifference regarding the first sample requires βN < 1/2.




(1− µ) (1− βN)
µ [(1− βS) θS + βS]
}
{
1− (1− µ) (1− βN)




When r1 ≤ v, p¯ = r1. Optimal search requires that Equation (2.1) holds. Substituting
Equation (70) into Equation (2.1) and integrating in order to solve for r1 in terms of µ, θS,
c, βS and βN , we get r (µ, θS, c, βS, βN) in the statement of the proposition.
By assumption, non-shoppers are indifferent between which firm to sample first. As per
the proof of Proposition 2, Weitzman's (1979) Pandora's Rule implies that r1 = r2 = r
and E1 [p] = E2 [p] in equilibrium. Using the expected price equality, we can now implicitly
solve for βN as a function of the remaining parameters. Following the same procedure as
in Proposition 2, we obtain the following expressions for firms' expected prices:
E1 [p] =
p¯ (1− µ) (1− βN)
µ [(1− βS) θS + βS] ln
{
1 +
µ [(1− βS) θS + βS]












(1− µ) (1− βN)
µ [(1− βS) θS + βS] + (1− µ) (1− βN)
}
[µ+ (1− µ) βN ]βS+θS−βSθS
µ (1 + βSθS − θS − βS)
×
{

























(1− µ) (1− βN)





Define r∗1 and r
∗
2 as the equilibrium reservation prices. If r1 (µ, θS, c, βS, βN) ≤ v, r∗1
is defined by r (µ, θS, c, βS, βN) in the statement of the proposition. Because firms are
not concerned with prices above v, if r1 (µ, θS, c, βS, βN) > v, we define r
∗
1 as positive
infinity. According to Equation (59), we can set r∗1 = r
∗
2.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. The crux of this proof relies on the fact that for all A ∈ (0, ∞), the function
A ln (1 + 1/A), is strictly increasing in A. Moreover, lim
A→0
A ln (1 + 1/A) = 0 and lim
A→∞
A ln (1 + 1/A) =
1. We again prove Part (2) of the proposition first.
2. Let A = [2 (1− µ) (1− βN)] / [µ (1 + θS)]. Substituting βS = 1/2 into r (µ, θS, c, βS, βN)
in Proposition 5 yields r (·) = c/ [1− A ln (1 + 1/A)]. This expression is clearly pos-
itive and we can see that it is increasing in A. Moreover, it can be seen that r (·) is
decreasing (increasing) in µ or θS as A decreases (increases) in µ or θS. Some straight-
forward algebraic manipulation of ∂A/∂µ and ∂A/∂θS completes the proof.
1. Define F1 (µ, θS, c; p) as the equilibrium distribution function when p¯ = r
∗ < v and
F1 (µ, θS, v; p) as the equilibrium distribution function when p¯ = v < r
∗. Addition-
ally, substituting βS = 1/2 and p¯ into the expression for F1 (p) in Proposition 5 and
manipulating algebraically gives us F1 (p) = 1 + A (1− p¯/p).
Suppose that p¯ = v < r∗. Because 1− p¯/p ≤ 0 for all p, F1 (µ, θS, v; p) is decreas-
ing in A (and strictly so for all p ∈ [0, v)). From the proof of Part (2), it follows




µ(1−µ) and increasing in






Suppose instead that p¯ = r∗ < v. Because r∗ is increasing in A, for any p ∈
[0, r∗), 1 − p¯/p strictly falls in A, becoming more negative. As in the paragraph
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above, the remainder of the proof is now a direct consequence of the proof of Part
(2).
Weitzman's (1979) Pandora's Rule (see in particular, Equation (59)) then im-
plies the relationships regarding expected prices.
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. This proof follows very similarly to that of Proposition 5, but with βN set to one or
zero as appropriate.




= E pii (pi, Fj (pi)) for F1 and F2
yields














= F2 (p) (74)
for all p ∈ (p, p¯). This implies that firm 1 has a higher reservation price and ex-
pected price, contradicting the assumption that non-shoppers prefer to sample it
first.
2. The solution to the profit equality condition now gives us F1 and F2 in the second
part of the statement of the proposition. Comparison of F1 and F2 will reveal that
when βN = 0, it must be that lim
x→p¯−
F2 (x) < 0, such that firm 2 is the one with
the mass point at p¯. Therefore, we may set F1(p¯) = 1 to solve for p in terms of p¯.
Substituting into F2 gives







When r2 ≤ v, p¯ = r2. Optimal search requires that Equation (2.1) holds. Substi-
tuting Equation (75) into Equation (2.1) and integrating in order to solve for r2 in
terms of µ, θS, and c, we get r2 (µ, θS, c) in the statement of the proposition. De-
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fine r∗2 as the equilibrium reservation price. If r2 (µ, θS, c) ≤ v, r∗2 is defined by
r2 (µ, θS, c). Because firms are not concerned with prices above v, if r2 (µ, θS, c) >
v, we define r∗2 as positive infinity.
B Proofs for Chapter2
Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma1: pii(p) is differentiable at ∀i, pi = p.
Proof. I want to show that, if a firm expects all other firms to charge a uniform price, that
firm's profit function is everywhere differentiable in its own price. First note that pi(p) =
(p1)V (S1(p)). Since the product of two differentiable functions is differentiable, then it
suffices to show that V (S1(p)) is differentiable in p1. S1(p) is equal to the intersection of
the sets of consumers that prefer firm 1 to firm j, for each j. Suppose that all other firms
charge a uniform price p. The region S1(p) is given by the set of x satisfying constraints
(76) and (77).
∀i, 0 ≤ xi (76)
∀j≥1, 0 ≤ p− p1 + t
n∑
k=1
(zjk − xk)2 − t
n∑
k=1
(z1k − xk)2 (77)
Define α = p − p1. Suppose that p1 > p and α < 0. From Lemma 2, only type one con-










F (α) is clearly differentiable in both alpha and p1. For the other case, suppose that p1 <
p. Every type of constraint will bind in this case. Once more consider the hypercube de-
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fined by the type 1 constraints. Let
Aj := {x ∈ Rn|xi ≤ δit+ α
2t




This is the set of points that constrant j excludes from the region defined by the type 1
constraints. Consider a constraint from firm j of type k, 0 ≤ α + t∑ki=1 δj − 2δjxj. To find
the measure of Aj, it will be helpful to define some notation. Let x¯i =
δit+α
2δit
, so type one
constraints are merely of the form 0 ≤ x¯i. Let σi =
∑k
j=i+1(1 − 2xj)δj if i < k and zero















1 dx1 dx2 . . . dxn
Since neither the constant function being integrated nor any of the bounds of integration
depend on xk+1 through xn, their only contribution to the integral will be to multiply by a
















1 dx1 dx2 . . . dxk
The region Aj is, geometrically speaking, a hyperpyramidal hyperprism. That is, it is a k
dimensional hyperpyramid that has been prismed into n-k other dimensions. Picturing the
regions Aj for a three dimensional cube may make it clearer why this must be the case,












It should be noted that V (Aj) = V (Ai) if firms i and j are both type k. This is true be-
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cause the hypercube may be rotated to move firm i into the position of firm j while pre-



























H ′(α) ≥ 0 by inspection. If α > 0, then V (S1(p)) = F (α) − V (
⋃2n−1
j=1 A
j). If all of the Aj
were pairwise disjoint, then the above would be equal to F (p) −H(α). However, since the
sets are not disjoint, construct the following sets.
E2 := {x ∈ Rn|∃i,j such that x ∈ Ai ∩ Aj}
E3 := {x ∈ Rn|∃i,j,k such that x ∈ Ai ∩ Aj ∩ Ak}
...




k=2 V (Ek). Then:
V (S0(p)) = F (α)−H(α) +G(α)
G′(α) ≥ 0, since each Aj is strictly increasing in α, it must also the case that each Ei is
also strictly increasing in α. Looking at the functional form of H(α), it is obvious that
H ′(α) ≥ 0. Since H(α) is a polynomial in α where each term is of degree at least two,
H ′(α)|α=0 = 0. Now, note that G(α) would grow fastest relative to H(α) in α if all of the
new volume were in the intersection of every Aj. Suppose, for a moment, that that is the
case. H ′(α) = (2n − 1) ∂
∂α
Aj, while G(α) = (2n − 2) ∂
∂α
Aj. So even in this most ideal case,
G′(α) ≤ H ′(α). Finally, the chain rule tells us that ∂
∂p1
F (α) = F ′(α), and likewise for
H(α). From the above, ∂
∂p1
V (S1(p)) is bounded between
∂
∂p1
F (α) and ∂
∂p1
(F (α) − H(α)).
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Thus the left derivative of the demand function is bounded above and below by ∂
∂p1
F (α).
This is also the right hand derivative of V (S1(p)) at p1 = p, and so V (S1(p)) is differen-
tiable at p1 = p. It is differentiable everywhere else by inspection.
Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2: If 2n firms are positioned in a reflectively symmetric arrangement on an n-cube,
only type one constraints bind.
Proof. We may assume that the price charged by the firm we are considering, p, is weakly
larger than that it expects its competitors to charge, pˆ. This is safe due to the differentia-
bility of the profit function and the fact that, in equilibrium, they will all charge the same
price. I wish to show that it is impossible for a vector to satisfy 2tδjxj ≤ δjt − p1 + p
for all j, but violate a constraint of the form
∑k
i=1 2tδixi ≤ p − p1 + t
∑k
i=1 δi. It suf-
fices to show that, for x2 through xk as large as they can be, the latter constraint is still
looser than the type one constraint for x1. Plugging these in, the type k constraint reduces
to x1 ≤ δ1t+(k−2)(p1−p)2δ1t , whereas the type one is given by x1 ≤
δ1t−p1+p
2δ1t
. Since p1 ≥ p
by assumption and in equilibrium, this holds and the type k constraint is, in fact, redun-
dant.
Proof of Theorem 1
If 2n firms locate in a reflectively symmetric positioning on an n-cube and compete in









Proof. Recall that there are two forms of the profit function for a potential deviant, pi1
for when p1 < p and pi
2 when p1 ≥ p. The difference stems from the fact that more con-
straints on the set of consumers captured may bind when p1 < p, so that D1 is weakly
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smaller in this case. Thus pi1(p) ≤ pi2(p)∀p. In a candidate symmetric equilibrium, p1 = p,
so the profit function follows pi2(p). Then, since pi2 is more optimistic, if firm 1 does not
wish to deviate if it assumes that the profit function always follows pi2, it will never wish







Any best response to an opposing strategy of p must either be on the boundary of the fea-
sible set or satisfy a first order condition. The boundaries are easily ruled out because set-
ting p1 = 0 earns zero profit in equilibrium and cannot be optimal, and an extremely large

































To ensure that this candidate equilibrium is actually an equilibrium, note that proposition
3 of Caplin and Nalebuff (Caplin and Nalebuff, 1991) guarantees that pi is quasiconcave
in p1. As long as p
∗ represents a local maximum, quasiconcavity guarantees that it is the















Since the candidate equilibrium satisfies the first order condition at a locally concave point,
it is a local and hence global maximum. It is the unique symmetric equilibrium because no
other symmetric pairing can satisfy the first order condition for pi2, a necessary condition
due to the differentiability of pi.
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Since the basic positioning dominates any reflectively symmetric positioning of 2n
firms on an n-cube, it suffices to show that the offset positioning dominates the basic posi-
tioning. Recall that each firm in the basic positioning on an n-cube earns pi∗ = t
2nn
. Then
this proof is simply a matter of showing that in any pricing equilibrium of the offset posi-
tion on an (n+1)-cube firms earn profits greater than pi∗.
First I must find the profit function of a potential deviant when firms are located in the
offset positioning. Define τ = 2t−p1+p
2t
and consider an (n+1)-cube. In any symmetric
equilibrium, only type 2 constraints bind. The argument for this is similar to the proof
of Lemma 1, and is thus omitted. I must find the volume of a region bounded by the fol-
lowing constraints
xi ≤ τ − xj ∀i,j
xi ≥ 0 ∀i
To clean up notation a bit, define Mi,j,k as Max{xi, xj, xk}. Then, the volume of this re-












Due to all of the maxima in the bounds of this integral, it is tiresome to evaluate directly.
Instead, consider the volume of the subregion in which xn+1 = M1,2,...n+1. This volume is





























If xn+1 is the largest coordinate, any other coordinate that satisfies xj ≤ τ − xn+1 will
satisfy all constraints. However, for xn+1 to be the largest coordinates, all others must be
smaller than it, meaning they can be no larger than Min[xn+1, τ − xn+1]. Then, after split-











The labeling of coordinates is arbitrary, here. The overall region can be partitioned into
n equal pieces, where each coordinate, in turn, is the largest. The total volume, therefore,
must be n times the volume I just found, or D1 =
τn+1
2n




Multiply D1 by p1 to get
pi0(p) = p1
(2t− p1 + p)n+1
2n+1tn+12n
Consider the first order condition (84).
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(2t− p1 + p)n+1
2n+1tn+12n




With the symmetry condition, (84) easily reduces to (85).
2t = (n+ 1)p1 (85)
Then our candidate equilibrium for the offset positioning is p = 2t
n+1
. The proof that this
is actually equilibrium follows the argument from the proof of Theorem 1 almost exactly.
There can be no symmetric equilibria with p < 2t
n+1
because every firm would have a prof-
itable deviation to an incrementally higher price. Then each firm will earn at least 2t
2n(n+1)
in equilibrium which is equal to pi∗ when n=1 and strictly greater for n ≥ 2.
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. In order for an allocation (a,b,p) to be an equilibrium, it must be the case either
that it is a local maximum at itself with respect to pi or that it lies on the boundary of the
feasible set. Otherwise, the deviant would have a local profitable deviation.
First, consider the cases in which (a,b,p) is a local maximum at itself with respect to pi.
In order to use calculus, the derivatives of pi(a, b, p, a, b, p) with respect to the fourth, fifth,
and sixth variables must exist at any feasible, interior (a,b,p). At any point (a,b,p,a,b,p),
ρ = φ , which means that the derivatives of the two halves of the profit function, pi1and pi2,
must agree at such points. Taking the derivatives and simplifying, we obtain that:
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Figure 1: Profits from various location strategies
∂pi1(a, b, p, a, b, p)
∂aˆ
=
(1− 2a)(3− 4a− 4b)p
8(1− a− b)2 =
∂pi2(a, b, p, a, b, p)
∂aˆ
(86)
∂pi1(a, b, p, a, b, p)
∂bˆ
=
(1− 2b)(3− 4a− 4b)p
8(1− a− b)2 =
∂pi2(a, b, p, a, b, p)
∂bˆ
(87)
∂pi1(a, b, p, a, b, p)
∂pˆ
=
1− a− b− 2p
4(1− a− b) =
∂pi2(a, b, p, a, b, p)
∂pˆ
(88)
The derivatives clearly exist, so by taking the above expressions, setting them equal to
zero and solving, I find that an interior (a,b,p) is a local maximum at itelf with respect
to pi only if:






















, .357, .357, .117), and the flat













It is clear that at least one of the sloped graphs is above the flat graph at every point in
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the continuum defined by (24). This means that at every point, a firm may make higher
profit by deviating to one of (.357,.357,.117) or (.5,.278,.12) rather than staying in equi-
librium. Then no point on the continuum is a global maximum at itself with respect to pi
and no such point is an equilibrium. It suffices to show that there are no boundary points
with global maxima at themselves with respect to pi.
First, consider the boundary in which p=0. If p=0, then firms cannot make any profit.
Unless all firms are piled on top of each other, a firm may make positive profit by charging
a extremely small but positive amount. If all firms are on top of each other, any firms will
have incentive to move away so that they may make positive profit by charging a positive
price. Therefore, there can be no equilibria with p=0.
Consider the boundary defined by b=0. The interior of this boundary is a ∈ (0, 1
2
) and
p ∈ R+. Suppose that firms have their choices restricted to this boundary and define
pˆi(a, p, aˆ, pˆ) = pi(a, 0, p, aˆ, 0, pˆ). For there to be an equilibrium on the interior of this bound-
ary, there must be an (a∗, p∗) that is a local maximum at itself with respect to pˆi. Taking
derivatives and setting them equal to zero, it is easy to see that no such (a∗, p∗) exists on
the interior of this boundary.
Using a similar technique for the a=1
2
boundary, we can find that such a point does exist.






). Note, however, that this point is on the continuum
scrutinized previously and cannot be an equilibrium.







), which is also on the continuum and not an equilibrium.











) cannot be an equi-
librium, as it would be impossible to make a positive profit. Again, by ruling out locally



















) to (.373, .373, .221).
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